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RESTITUTION PAYMENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL FINES
Part I - Introductory
Although section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code states, in
unlimited form, the general rule that "[t]here shall be allowed as a
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,"' other provisions
of the Code in fact create exceptions to that general rule. One such
limiting provision is section 162(f), which states that "[n]o deduction
shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any fine or similar penalty paid
to a government for the violation of any law.",
2
Section 162(f) was added to the Code by the Tax Reform Act of
1969' as part of a congressional adoption, in circumscribed form, of a
judicially created doctrine. Under this doctrine, deductions for
expenditures meeting all the existing statutory requisites for deductibility
were disallowed whenever the court determined that "allowance of the
deduction would frustrate sharply defined national or state policies
proscribing the particular types of conduct evidenced by some
governmental declaration thereof."
Congress was probably spurred to action in this area by the Internal
Revenue Service's ruling issued five years earlier.' The ruling declared
that amounts paid as treble damages under the Clayton Act were
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.6 The legislative
response to this ruling, however, was not confined to addressing the
deductibility of treble damages. Rather, Congress comprehensively dealt
with the entire "public policy" disallowance area by enacting section 902"
of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which enacted section 162(f) and also:7
1. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1994) (emphasis added).
2. I.R.C. § 162(f) (1994).
3. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 710 (1969).
4. S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 273-75 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423 at
596-98.
5. Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 C.B. 52.
6. See John Taggart, Fines, Penalties, Bribes, and Damage Payments and Recoveries, 25
Tax L. Rev. 611, 617-18 (1970).
7. In his excellent and frequently cited article, John Taggart also included along with
these four provisions the enactment of Code section 186 by Section 904 of the Tax Reform Act
of 1969. Id. Code section 186 was intended to allow a deduction for certain antilrust and other
damage recoveries where the original injury produced a net operating loss which resulted in no
tax benefit to the taxpayer. Id. at 628. However, while Code section 186 addressed antitrust
damages, its thrust is different from the other provisions, all of which deny an ordinary and
necessary expense deduction for expenditures deemed by Congress to violate some public policy.
Accordingly, Code section 186 is excluded from the present discussion.
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(1) added Code section 162(g), which denies a section
162(a) deduction for two-thirds of an antitrust treble-
da.iage payment following a criminal conviction or plea of
guilty or noo contendere;
(2) expanded Code section 162(c) (and renumbered it
162(c)(1)) so as to deny a section 162(a) deduction for any
illegal bribe or kickback given to an official or employee
of any government (the prior section 162(c) having applied
only to payments made to foreign government officials);
anY
(3) added Code section 162(c)(2), which in its original
form denied a section 162(a) deduction for any illegal
bribe or kickback given to someone other than a
governmental official or employee where the taxpayer had
been convicted (or pled guilty or nolo contendere) in a
criminal proceeding for making the payment
These four provisions originated in the Senate Finance Committee,
which indicated in its report (hereinafter "the 1969 Senate Report"), that
the legislation was intended to preempt the area. The report stated:
The provision added by the committee amendments denies deductions
for four types of expenditures. . . . The provision for the denial of
the deduction for payments in these situations which are deemed to
violate public policy is intended to be all inclusive. Public policy, in
other circumstances, generally is not sufficiently clearly defined to
justify the disallowance of deductions. 9
The regulations effectuate this intent by providing that
"[a] deduction for an expense paid or incurred after December 30, 1969,
which would otherwise be allowed under section 162 shall not be denied
on the grounds that allowance of such deduction would frustrate a sharply
defined public policy."'" Therefore, if a deduction for payment of a
fine or other penalty is not precluded by section 162(f), a section 162(a)
8. The original version of section 162(c)(2) was significantly changed by section 310(a)
of the Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497 (1971). The original version provided:
(2) Other bribes or kickbacks.-If in a criminal proceeding a taxpayer is
convicted of making a payment (other than a payment described in paragraph (1))
which is an illegal bribe or kickback, or his plea of guilty or nolo contendere to an
indictment or information charging the making of such a payment is entered or
accepted in such a proceeding, no deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a)
on account of such payment or any related payment made prior to the date of final
judgment in such proceeding.
9. 1969 S. Rep., supra note 4, at 273.
10. Treas. Reg.§ 1.162-1(a) (1975).
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deduction cannot be denied to the taxpayer on nonstatutory "public
policy" grounds."
The 1969 Senate Report also indicated, questionably, that section
162(f) was a codification of the prior "public policy" case law applying
to fines and penalties. "[T]he committee amendments provide that no
deduction is to be allowed for any fine or similar penalty paid to a
government for the violation of any law. . . . This represents a
codification of the general court position in this respect."'
' 2
The purpose of this article is to analyze section 162(f) and its
application to two recently notorious situations involving vast sums of
money. The first situation is that of the stock swindler/manipulator in the
image of Ivan Boesky or Michael Milken who is caught and ordered to
make restitution. The second situation is that of the environmental
polluter in the image of the operator of the Exxon Valdiz who incurs
penalties as a result of intentional or accidental conduct."
To present section 162(f) in proper perspective, Part II of this article
briefly examines the policy considerations that underly the legislative
decision to deny deductions, on "public policy" grounds, for payments
otherwise deductible under section 162(a). In particular, Part II responds
to certain recent criticisms of such disallowances, criticisms which this
author believes to be overstated at best. Part III briefly reviews the pre-
1969 "public policy" disallowance doctrine as it was developed by the
courts. This review is helpful both as background and because such cases
are still referred to when difficulties in applying section 162(f) are
encountered. Part IV analyzes section 162(f) in detail, and Parts V and
VI, respectively, discuss the applicability of section 162(f) to restitution
payments and to impositions on the environmental polluter. Part VII is
a short conclusion.
11. It should be noted that while the pre-1969 "public policy" doctrine has been preempted
in the context of section 162(a), the doctrine has survived elsewhere. Notably, many post-1969
cases disallow on "public policy" grounds losses otherwise deductible under section 165. See,
e.g., Wood v. United States, 693 F. Supp. 452 (E.D. La. 1988); Holt v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.
75 (1977), affdper curiam, 611 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1980). Lincoln v. Commissioner, 50
T.C.M. 185 (1985); Holmes Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 114 (1977); But see
Medeiros v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1255, 1262 n.8 (1981). See also Rev. Rul. 77-126, 1977-1
C.B. 47.
12. 1969 S. Rep., supra note 4, at 273.
13. With respect to impositions on the environmental polluter, this article will focus only
on whether or not section 162(f) is applicable to the payments involved. It will not address the
issue of whether such payments must be capitalized or may be deducted immediately. As to the
latter issue, see e.g., Thomas H. Yancey, Emerging Doctrines in the Tax Treatment of
Environmental Cleanup Costs, 70 TAXES 948 (1992); Sloane Elizabeth Anders, The Federal Tax
System and the Environment: Should Payments Made Pursuant to CERCLA be Deductible, 10
VA. TAX. REv. 707 (1991).
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Part II - Policy Considerations
The basic justification advanced in favor of the disallowance of
deductions for otherwise deductible expenditures, such as payment of
fines and penalties or for illegal, antisocial and other undesirable
purposes, is that the government should not bear any part of the cost of
reprehensible behavior, even if incurred in the normal course of a trade
or business. Rather, the tax law should discourage such activities by
denying them the tax recognition afforded to payments made in the
course of engaging in inoffensive business behavior.14
Opponents, who argue that such "public policy" considerations ought
not result in the disallowance of otherwise available section 162(a)
deductions, generally make one or more of the five arguments discussed
in the following paragraphs.' 5  Upon examination, these arguments
appear to be the same as the objections voiced to the pre-1969 judicially
created public policy doctrine. 6  These arguments did not "carry the
day" then and are no more persuasive today.
"Purity" Objection on the Taxation of Net Income-Having made the
fundamental decision that only net income should be subject to income
taxation, 7 Congress, notwithstanding its undoubted power to make
exceptions, 8 ought not do so on a selective basis. However, in light of
the fact that the current income tax is in numerous respects so very far
removed from a pure tax on net income, 9 such a "purity" objection in
not persuasive.
Purpose of the Income Tax--Opponents of disallowance of
deductions assert that the basic purpose of the income tax is to raise
revenue and that the tax system is not a proper vehicle to punish
wrongdoers. However, we must not lose sight of the forest for the trees.
The tax law, is one part of many laws legislated by Congress to govern
the United States. Our conceptions of morality and right and wrong
14. See generally James W. Colliton, The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved
Payments, 9. TAX REV. 273, 277-78 (1989).
15. See generally, Colliton, supra note 14.
16. See generally, George G. Tyler, Disallowance of Deductions on Public Policy Grounds,
20 TAX L. REv. 665, 667 n.10 (1965).
17. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162, 212, & 165 (1994) (allowing deductions for trade or business
expenses, costs of earning non-trade or business income, and for losses incurred in trade or
business or certain profit-seeking activities); Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S.
30, 33 (1958); Colliton, supra note 14, at 273-74.
18. See, e.g., Colliton, supra note 14, at 280 (recognizing that Congress could tax gross
income should it choose to do so).
19. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7872 (1994) (taxing imputed income); 1.RC. § 475, 1256 (1994)
(taxing unrealized gains and losses). See Murphy v. United States, 992 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1993)
(upholding section 1256).
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ought not stop at the threshold of title 26 of the U.S. Code and magically
reappear at title 27. To the contrary, if Congress identifies certain
conduct as unacceptable, the tax law should act on that judgment by
adding costs to such behavior. In 1983 The United States Supreme Court
adopted this point of view when, without benefit of a specific statute and
on purely public policy grounds, it denied tax exempt status to a
university that engaged in racial discrimination.2"
Unintended Penalties-This argument rests on the theory that
disallowing a deduction for a particular penalty or fine imposes (in the
form of higher taxes) an additional punishment not intended by the
relevant legislative body. This point is valid only if the legislature
intended such payment to be deductible. If that was not the intent, then
allowing a deduction for such a payment would lessen the intended sting
of the penalty and would be improper.2" Admittedly the legislature's
actual intent is usually unknown,22 but, when faced with this issue, the
Supreme Court assumed that the payments involved (penalties) were not
intended to be deductible.23 Moreover, when the legislature enacts or
reenacts a fine or penalty, courts should presume the legislature intended
the fine or penalty to be nondeductible since the legislature acted with
either actual or constructive knowledge of section 162(f).
Unequal Impact on Equally Guilty Taxpayers-A further argument
in opposition to the public policy disallowance is that the rendering of
particular payments nondeductible affects taxpayers differently depending,
not on their relative culpability, but solely on their marginal tax rates.
The following excerpt, which was directed specifically at section 162(f),
illustrates the argument:
The effect of this codification of moral outrage is that
the wrongdoer must pay additional fines in the form of
higher taxes. Equally guilty taxpayers who are taxed at
different marginal rates pay different amounts of tax.
Three examples will illustrate this disparity of treatment.
Assume that Taxpayers A, B, and C were involved in a
profitable illegal enterprise and that a state government
agency appropriately fined each $40,000 because of his
activities. Under section 162(0 the fine is not deductible
to A, B, or C.
20. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
21. See Taggart, supra note 6, at 615 n.5.
22. Id.
23. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1958). See infra notes
57-63 and accompanying text.
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If Taxpayer A is an individual taxed at a marginal rate of
28 percent, his extra tax because of the deduction
disallowance is $11,200. His total cost of the penalty is
$51,200, consisting of the $40,000 fine plus $11,200 in
increased taxes. The economic effect of the deduction
denial is the same as if the federal government imposed its
own fine on Taxpayer A for the violation at a rate of 28
percent on the amount of the state fine ...
By comparison, Taxpayer B committed the same offense
and was fined the same $40,000, but is taxed at the
marginal rate of 15 percent. He will only face an
additional tax of $6,000 as a result of the fine. He is
equally guilty, but pays substantially less than Taxpayer A
because he is taxed at a lower marginal rate. His total cost
of fine plus deduction denial is $46,000.
Finally, a taxpayer who has no taxable income suffers
no detriment from the deduction denial. Assume that
Taxpayer C committed the same offense and was fined the
same amount but is in jail and has no taxable income. The
deduction denial causes Taxpayer C no tax detriment. He
has no taxable income to offset with the deduction. His
total cost is only the $40,000 fine, with no additional tax
penalty.2'
Although the commentator is correct to the extent that the change
from deductible to nondeductible would affect A, B, and C differently,
he is incorrect in asserting that they receive unequal treatment by reason
of the mere existence of a disallowance rule. In fact, the opposite is true,
because making the fines nondeductible actually levels out the unequal
treatment that would have resulted if deductions had been allowed. This
leveling effect can be seen in the following chart, which shows the net
costs to A, B, and C if deductions had been allowed:
A B C
Fine paid $40,000 $40,000 $40,000
Value of deduction 11,200 6,000 -0-
Net cost $28,800 $34,000 $40,000
Clearly, a system that allows such deductions causes inequality of treatment,
while a system that eliminates deductibility is corrective. Absent deductions,
each of the taxpayers has the same net cost of $40,000. Presumably, the
legislature intended this effect by imposing a $40,000 fine. It seems unlikely
that the legislature intended the punishment to be $40,000 less a tax savings
24. Colliton, supra note 14, at 283-84 (footnote omitted).
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depending on the wrongdoer's marginal income tax bracket. (The figures of
$51,200 and $46,000 in the excerpt are specious; the commentator did not
subtract the deductions of $11,200 and $6,000 before he added them back.)
Disparate Rules for Comparable Expenditures-The argument here is that
the process of line-drawing sometimes leads to differing results to taxpayers who
are engaged in similar activities. For instance, a taxpayer who pays a punitive
imposition to a government will not be able to claim a deduction for such
payment by virtue of section 162(0, but one who pays a similar imposition to
a non-governmental payee will encounter no similar disallowance of his
deduction." Similarly, under section 162(c)(3), a deduction is disallowed for
the payment of a kickback, rebate or bribe made in connection with the Medicare
or Medicaid programs, but such disallowance provision does not extend to a
similar payment made to another government agency, such as the Veterans
Administration.26
On reflection, this objection has little weight. It is not to having a line, but
to where the line is drawn. By its very nature a line is located between points
that are not distant from one another. If that were a sufficient reason for
rejecting a rule, precious few would enjoy existence.
Part III - The Pre-1969 "Public Policy" Doctrine
Prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the courts
frequently disallowed, on "public policy" grounds, deductions for
expenditures that, in ordinary understanding, seemed to be qualified for
deductibility but which, in the courts' view, were inappropriate for the
tax system to sanction. While judicially created doctrines sometimes
develop well-defined contours and parameters, this doctrine was not well-
defined because something as amorphous as public policy was the guiding
principle. Rather, disparate and inconsistent outcomes resulted as the
"public policy" disallowance doctrine was utilized to challenge the
deductibility of, among others, illegal expenditures," expenditures that
were not per se illegal but which were part of a larger scheme that was
illegal,2" antitrust treble-damage payments," legal fees incurred in the
25. See generally Catherine M. Del Castillo, Should Punitive Damages Be Nondeductible?
The Expansion of the Public Policy- Doctrine, 68 TEx. L. REv. 819 (1990).
26. Colliton, supra note 14, at 293. It should be noted that other disallowance sections,
such as section 162(c)(1), could disallow the deduction for the payment to the Veteran's
Administration. i.RC. § 162(c) (1) (1994). However, those other sections also contain arbitrary
lines which could result in equally guilty taxpayers being treated differently. See Colliton, supra
note 14, at 287-92.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Worcester, 190 F. Supp. 548 (D. Mass. 1961); Boyle, Flagg
& Seaman, Inc. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 43 (1955).
28. See, e.g., Doyle v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1956); McGrath v.
Commissioner, 27 T.C. 117 (1956).
29. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 C.B. 52.
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defense of criminal charges,3° legal fees incurred in connection with
civil matters arising out of criminal cases3 and fines and penalties
paid.32 One commentator aptly described the confusion in this area as
follows:
It may be received learning that the path of the common
law resembles rather the gnarled oak than the clean lines
of a Brancusi sculpture. In the field of the public policy
exception, however, even the outlines of the trees had been
lost to view as the result of unchecked proliferation of
obscure distinctions.33
Rather than try to make sense out of the myriad of lower court
"public policy" cases, it will suffice for present purposes to examine in
some detail, in chronological order, the six decisions rendered by the
Supreme Court in this area.
Before doing so, however, it may be helpful to dispose of a
potentially confusing point that is properly viewed as being purely
semantic in character. Evidently due to a reluctance to be perceived as
judicial activists by overruling, on "public policy" grounds, a statute that
expressly allowed deductions of all "ordinary and necessary" business
expenses, some courts clothed their actions in the fiction that the
expenditures in question were not "ordinary and necessary," no matter
how normal and essential they were to the conduct of the business.
The Supreme Court focused on this point in its 1943 decision in
Commissioner v. Heininger,34 the first of the six subject decisions. After
30. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
31. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
32. See, e.g., Universal Atlas Cement Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 971 (1947), affd, 171
F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 962 (1949); Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland
Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945).
33. Note, Business Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy: Some Problems of
Sanctioning With The Internal Revenue Code, 72 Yale UJ. 108, 109 (1962) See also Tyler,
supra note 16, at 675 (holding that the lower court pronouncements are an "uncharted sea"). In
addition to the six cases discussed in the text, there are three other cases that are sometimes cited
in the "public policy" area but which are distinguishable. In both Textile Mills Securities Corp.
v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941) and Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959),
the Supreme Court held that a taxpayer's lobbying expenses were not deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses. However, the result was based on the existence of long-standing
regulations, not on "public policy" grounds. See Tyler, supra note 16, at 670. In Clarke v.
Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384 (1930), the Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice Holmes, disallowed a deduction for a loss resulting from the adoption of the prohibition
amendment. While this decision has an underlying public policy flavor, it has never been viewed
as such; rather, it has been analyzed in terms of the effect of the constitutional amendment. See
Business Expenses, supra note 33, at 109 n.3.
34. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
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remarking that the payments in question plainly "were both 'ordinary and
necessary' if those words [are] to be given their commonly accepted
meaning," the Court noted that "[t]he Bureau of Internal Revenue, the
Board of Tax Appeals, and the Federal courts have from time to time,
however, narrowed the generally accepted meaning of the language used
in [the then current predecessor of section 162(a)] in order that tax
deduction consequences might not frustrate sharply defined national or
state policies proscribing particular types of conduct."" The Court then
endorsed the public policy approach, referred to as "the principle
involved." The Court also cited a number of instances in which it had
been applied although it was careful not to approve or disapprove any
specific application because, as it said, "each case should depend upon its
peculiar circumstances. '"36
The validity of the "principle" referred to in Heininger, that non-
deductible public policy expenditures did not pass the "ordinary and
necessary" test of the statute (hereinafter referred to as "the special-
meaning-of-necessary approach"), was called into question by the Court's
1952 opinion in Lilly v. Commissioner,37 the second of the six subject
decisions. The Court proceeded by "[a]ssuming for the sake of argument
that, under some circumstances, business expenditures which are ordinary
and necessary in the generally accepted meanings of those words may not
be deductible as 'ordinary and necessary' expenses under . . . [the
immediate predecessor of section 162(a)] when they 'frustrate sharply
defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct"'
(which the Court was able to do by finding that "the expenditures now
before us do not fall in that class")."8
It is noteworthy that, although the Court refrained from endorsing
the special-meaning-of-necessary approach, it nevertheless attempted to
define the test by holding that "[t]he policies frustrated must be national
or state policies evidenced by some governmental declaration of them.""
On March 17, 1958, the Supreme Court issued opinions in three
companion cases in the "public policy" disallowance area. Tank Truck
Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,4" the Court specifically embraced the
special-meaning-of-necessary approach. The Court said that "[a] finding
of 'necessity' cannot be made . . .if allowance of the deduction would
35. Id at 471, 473.
36. Id. at 473.
37. 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
38. Id. at 96-97.
39. Id at 97 (emphasis added).
40. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
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frustrate sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular
types of conduct, evidenced by some governmental declaration
thereof."' Interestingly, the other two opinions, Hoover Motor Express
Co., Inc. v. United States,42 and Commissioner v. Sullivan, a contain no
comparable statement.
More pointedly, in Hoover Motor Express Co., the Court's
reluctance to declare an otherwise ordinary and necessary expenditure
nondeductible solely on public policy grounds is vividly illustrated."
The Court went out of its way to create a new definition of "necessary"
tailored to Hoover's facts. 45  Applying this definition, the Court held
that Hoover's fines were not "necessary" because they were avoidable.46
However, the Court has since ignored avoidability as a parameter of
"necessary. '
In any event, the special-meaning-of-necessary approach was put to
rest in the last of the six cases. In Commissioner v. Tellier,4s the
Government had conceded that the expenditures in question were both
"ordinary" and "necessary" within the meaning of section 162(a).49 But
that was not the end of the matter. As reported by the Court, "[t]he
Commissioner and the Tax Court determined, however, that even though
the expenditures meet the literal requirements of § 162(a), their deduction
must nevertheless be disallowed on the ground of public policy."'5
Significantly, the Court entertained the argument, despite the concession
of statutory ordinariness and necessity. 51 Ultimately, the Court did hold
in favor of the taxpayer, but only because it concluded that "no such
'public policy' exception to the plain provisions of § 162(a) is warranted
in the circumstances presented by this case. ' 2 Thus, despite the demise
of the special-meaning-of-necessary approach as a matter of language, the
identical underlying issue remained: did "public policy" require
disallowance of the claimed deduction?
41. Id. at 33-34.
42. 356 U.S. 38 (1958).
43. 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
44. Hoover Motor Express Co., 356 U.S. at 38.
45. Id. at 39.
46. Id. See Tyler, supra note 16, at 666 n.3.
47. See Arthur W. Andrews, Rule 11 and the Nondeductibility of Monetary Sanctions
Imposed Upon Attorneys, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 279, 306 (1990). See also, Mason and Dixon Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 708 F.2d 1043, 1045 (6th Cir. 1983).
48. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
49. Id. at 689.
50. Id. at 690.
51. Id. at 690-91.
52. Id. at 691 (emphasis added).
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We now turn to the six cases in which the Supreme Court addressed
that issue.
Commissioner v. Heininger." In this case, the taxpayer, a dentist,
sold false teeth through the mail.54 The Post Office thought the
taxpayer's circulars and advertisements were false and misleading. A
hearing was held at which the taxpayer, with counsel, vigorously
defended himself. The hearing officer found against the taxpayer and
issued a fraud order prohibiting the local postmaster from delivering mail
to the taxpayer and from cashing any postal money orders payable to the
taxpayer." Fearing that this order would destroy his business, the
taxpayer promptly sought and obtained an injunction in the local federal
district court against enforcement of the order.56 On appeal, the court
of appeals reversed and dissolved the injunction.57 At issue was the
deductibility, as an ordinary and necessary business expense, of the
taxpayer's legal fees at the Post Office hearing and in the courts."
After holding that contesting the destruction of his business was most
appropriate and, therefore, within the usual ambit of ordinary and
necessary business expenses, the Supreme Court held there was no public
policy objection to the deduction.59 The only relevant public policy,
said the Court, was to protect the public from fraudulent practices
committed through the mails. This policy was intended neither to punish
violators nor to prevent an accused from defending himself against such
allegations. The Court viewed the legal fees as having only a remote
relation to the underlying illegal act. This remote relationship was not
enough to make them nondeductible.6"
Lilly v. Commissioner.6' In this case, the taxpayers were in the
optical business. Pursuant to established and widespread industry
practice, they had made payments (equal to one-third of the amounts
received by them from purchasers of eyeglasses) to the doctors who had
prescribed the eyeglasses and recommended purchase from them.62
Although the payments were not illegal when made,63 the Board of Tax
53. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).




58. Heininger, 320 U.S. at 470.
59. Id. at 471.
60. Id. at 474-75.
61. 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
62. Id. at 92.
63. From the opinion it appears that after the years in issue in the case several states,
including North Carolina, passed legislation making such payments illegal. Id. at 97.
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Appeals and the Fourth Circuit upheld the Commissioner's disallowance
of these payments on the ground that they violated public policy.64
Noting that the payments were not illegal and that the court was not
voicing approval of the business ethics or the public policy involved in
making such payments, the Supreme Court reversed and held the
payments to be deductible.65 The payments were found to be ordinary
and necessary business expenses because such payments "were normal,
usual and customary in size and character"66 and essential for the
continued existence of the business. Based on Heininger, the Court
declared that ordinary and necessary business expenses would be
nondeductible only when disallowance was necessary to prevent the
frustration of sharply defined national or state policies that proscribe
particular types of conduct.67 According to the Court, such policies had
to be evidenced by some governmental declaration of them6" and during
the years in issue there was no such declaration.
Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner.69 In Tank Truck, which
was one of three companion cases decided by the Supreme Court on the
same day, the issue focused on the deductibility of some $41,000 in fines
that were incurred by the taxpayer for over 700 intentional and 28
innocent violations of Pennsylvania's maximum weight laws for
trucks.7" The taxpayer, a Pennsylvania corporation, trucked bulk liquids
in Pennsylvania and five surrounding states, each of which imposed
maximum weight limits for motor vehicles operating on its highways.'
Pennsylvania restricted truckers to 45,000 pounds while the other states
allowed a maximum weight of 60,000 pounds. Due to competitive
factors and the nature of the bulk liquid trucking business, it would have
been impossible for any industry member to survive economically if it
complied with Pennsylvania's maximum weight restrictions.
Consequently, the taxpayer, like every other member of the industry,
deliberately operated its trucks overweight in Pennsylvania and paid the
resultant fines whenever it was caught.72
In upholding the lower courts' disallowance of any deduction for the
fines, the Supreme Court started by acknowledging that the income tax
64. Id. at 92.
65. Id. at 94.
66. Lilly, 343 U.S. at 96.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 97.
69. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
70. Id. at 31.
71. Id. at 32.
72. Id. at 33.
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laws were intended to tax only net income, not gross income (section
23(a)(1)(A) of the 1939 Code, like its successor provision, current Code
section 162(a), allowed a deduction for "[a]ll the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business").73 Nevertheless, the Court held that the payment of the
fines gave rise to no deductions. Borrowing from the reasoning in
Heininger and Lilly, the Court noted that "[a]llowance of the deduction
would frustrate sharply defined national or state policies proscribing
particular types of conduct, evidenced by some governmental declaration
thereof."74
Here, a penal statute was enacted to protect highways from damage
and to insure the safety of all persons using them. If the deduction in
issue were allowed, said the Court, it would "encourage continued
violations of state law by increasing the odds in favor of
noncompliance." '75 The Court further stated that such a deduction
"could only tend to destroy the effectiveness of the State's maximum
weight laws.76
The Supreme Court cautioned, however, that the public policy
disallowance doctrine should not be applied in an absolute sense, but that
each case must turn on its own facts. "The test of nondeductibility
always is the severity and immediacy of the frustration resulting from
allowance of the deduction."77  Such a "flexible" standard was
necessary, the Court said, in order "to accommodate both the
congressional intent to tax only net income, and the presumption against
congressional intent to encourage violation of declared public policy."78
Lest too much be read into the "encourage" language, it should be
noted that the Court did not limit its holding to intentional violations.
Rather, it held that, "since the maximum weight statutes make no
distinction between innocent and willful violators," the fines innocently
incurred by the taxpayer were nondeductible as well.79
As to what sort of expenditures should be denied deductibility, the
Court described two categories, one considered to be the clearest instance
and one considered to be less clear.
73. Id.
74. Tank Truck Rentals, 356 U.S. at 33-34.
75. Id. at 36.
76. Id.
77. Id at 35.
78. Id.
79. Tank Truck Rentals, 356 U.S. at 36.
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Certainly the frustration of state policy is most complete
and direct when the expenditure for which deduction is
sought is itself prohibited by statute. If the expenditure is
not itself an illegal act, but rather the payment of a penalty
imposed by the State because of such an act, ... the
frustration attendant upon deduction would be only slightly
less remote, and would clearly fall within the line of
disallowance."
Commissioner v. Sullivan."1 In this case, the Supreme Court
encountered the very situation it had described in Tank Truck as the most
clear candidate for nondeductibility under the "public policy"
disallowance doctrine. Under applicable Illinois law, not only was
conducting a gambling operation illegal, but the mere payment of wages
and rent in connection with such an operation was specifically
forbidden. 2 These types of expenditures were at-issue in Sullivan. The
Court undoubtedly had before it a case in which, in the words of the
simultaneous Tank Truck opinion, "the expenditure for which deduction
is sought is itself prohibited by statute.8 3 Yet, amazingly, the Court
allowed the claimed deductions.
The amounts paid as wages to employees and to the
landlord as rent are "ordinary and necessary expenses" in
the accepted meaning of the words. That is enough to
permit the deduction, unless it is clear the allowance is a
device to avoid the consequence of violations of a law, as
in Hoover Motor Express . . .and Tank Truck. . .. or
otherwise contravenes the federal policy expressed in a
statute or regulation...84
In support of its conclusion, the Court stated as follows:
At times the policy to disallow expenses in connection
with certain condemned activities is clear. . . . Any
inference of disapproval of these [rent and wage] expenses
as deductions is absent here. The Regulations, indeed,
point the other way, for they make the federal excise tax
on wagers deductible as an ordinary and necessary expense.
The policy that allows as a deduction the tax paid to
conduct the business seems sufficiently hospitable to allow
80. Id. at 35-36.
81. 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
82. Id. at 28.
83. Tank Truck Rentals, 356 U.S. at 35.
84. Sullivan, 356 U.S. at 29.
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the normal deductions of the rent and wages necessary to
operate it. We said in Heininger that the "fact that an
expenditure bears a remote relation to an illegal act" does
not make it nondeductible. If we enforce as federal policy
the rule espoused by the Commissioner in this case, we
would come close to making this type of business taxable
on the basis of its gross receipts, while all other businesses
would be taxable on the basis of net income. If that
choice is to be made, Congress should do it.8"
Whether or not one agrees with Sullivan, it is certainly difficult, if
not impossible, to reconcile its holding with the rationale that was
expressed in Tank Truck.
Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States.86  This third case
decided on the same day as Tank Truck and Sullivan, involved
overweight fines similar to those involved in Tank Truck except that none
of the violations were intentional.87 First, the Court held that the
taxpayer's payments gave rise to no deduction inasmuch as such
expenditures were not "necessary" within the meaning of the statute, not
on "public policy" grounds, but because the fines could have been
avoided with little effort. 8 In fact, the Court seemed to go out of its
way to create this new definition of "necessary" tailored to the facts of
the case before it.89 Second, it followed Tank Truck in holding that
allowing a deduction for a fine paid for even an inadvertent violation of
a state's maximum weight law would frustrate the state's public policy
where that law does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional
infractions.90
Commissionerv. Tellier.9' In this 1966 case, the last section 162(a)
"public policy" cases9 2 to come before it, the Court was faced with the
85. Id. at 28-29.
86. 356 U.S. 38 (1958).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 40. Here the taxpayer incurred the fines largely from violations of the axle
weight limits, rather than a violation of over-all truck weight limit. Normally, these violations
occurred because the freight load shifted during transit. Id. Such violations could have been
prevented by tying down the load or compartmentalizing the truck. Id. Other violations occurred
when the taxpayer accepted the weight stated on the bill of lading in small communities having
no weighing facilities. These violations could have been prevented by carrying a scale in the
trucks. Id.
89. As pointed out above, the Court has since ignored avoidability as a parameter of
"necessary." See supra notes 45 and 46 and accompanying text.
90. Sullivan, 356 U.S. at 40.
91. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
92. In 1983 the Supreme Court decided Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983), in which it applied public policy to disallow tax exempt status to educational institutions
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need to reconcile these three companion cases together with Heininger
and Lilly.
In Tellier, the issue was the deductibility under section 162(a) of the
cost incurred by the taxpayer in the unsuccessful defense of a criminal
prosecution. The taxpayer, who had been engaged in the business of
underwriting, selling and purchasing securities for resale to the public,
was charged with committing securities and mail fraud, charges of which
he was ultimately convicted. 93 In the course of defending against the
charges, the taxpayer paid almost $23,000 in legal expenses, the
deductibility of which was challenged. 94
In upholding the deductibility of the legal expenses, the Court first
considered whether the expenses fit within the usual ambit of ordinary
and necessary business expenses under section 162(a)."
Notwithstanding that the Government had conceded the point, the Court
discussed the meanings of "ordinary" and "necessary" as used in the
statute, and concluded that it was "clear that the respondent's legal fees
were deductible under § 162(a) if the provisions of that section are to be
given their normal effect in this case.,
96
The Court then examined the Government's argument "that even
though the expenditures meet the literal requirements of
§ 162(a), their deduction must nevertheless be disallowed on the ground
of public policy. '97 Rejecting that contention, the Court explained that
"the federal income tax is a tax on net income, not a sanction against
wrongdoing" and that illegal income is taxed the same as lawful
income.9" With only a few limited and well-defined exceptions, the
basic rule for deductions is the same.
that were guilty of racial discrimination and to also disallow a section 170 charitable deduction
for contributions to such institutions. However, Bob Jones did not involve the section 162
"ordinary and necessary" business expense deductions.
93. Tellier, 383 U.S. at 35.
94. Id.
95. In its discussion of "ordinary," the Supreme Court seemed to changed its focus from
prior cases. Here, the Court stated simply that the principal function of the term "ordinary" was
to distinguish expenses from capital expenditures. Id. at 689-90. However, in the past, the Court
had defined "ordinary" as customary or usual to the group of which the taxpayer was a member,
as initially pronounced in Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933), and Deputy v. duPont, 308
U.S. 488 (1940). See, e.g., Commissioner v. heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 472 (1943).
See generally JOHN E. DAVIDIAN & JACOB L. TODRES, REDUCING PERSONAL INCOME
TAXES: A GUIDE TO DEDUCTIONS AND CREDITS §§ 2.03 and 2.04 (Law Journal Seminars Press,
1992).
96. Tellier, 383 U.S. at 690.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 691.
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To elaborate on this principle, the Court pointed out that "[d]uring
the Senate debate in 1913 on the bill that became the first modem income
tax law, amendments were rejected that would have limited deductions
for losses to those incurred in a 'legitimate' or 'lawful' trade or
business." 99 The Court also quoted the following portion of the floor
statement of Senator Williams, who was in charge of the bill:
[T]he object of this bill is to tax a man's net income; that is to say,
what he has at the end of the year after deducting from his receipts
his expenditures or losses. It is not to reform men's moral characters;
that is not the object of the bill at all. The tax is not levied for the
purpose of restraining people from betting on horse races or upon
'futures,' but the tax is framed for the purpose of making a man pay
upon his net income, his actual profit during the year. The law does
not care where he got it from, so far as the tax is concerned, although
the law may very properly care in another way."
The Court further noted that this principle was reflected in its
Sullivan,'' Lilly 0 2 and Heininger °3 opinions.
The Court then continued that, absent specific legislation or a long-
standing regulation requiring disallowance, it had only "countenanced"
exceptions to the basic rule of deductibility in extremely limited
circumstances. Citing Heininger,'°4 Lilly,'0 5 and Tank Truck,106 the
Court explained:
Only where the allowance of a deduction would "frustrate
sharply defined national or state policies proscribing
particular forms of conduct" have we upheld its
disallowance. Further, the "policies frustrated must be
national or state policies evidenced by some governmental
declaration of them." Finally, the "test of nondeductibility
always is the severity and immediacy of the frustration
resulting from allowance of the deduction."'
0 7
As illustrations of situations in which judicial disallowance was
justified, the Court cited Tank Truck and Hoover Motor Express, and
said, "we upheld the disallowance of deductions claimed by taxpayers for
99. Id.
100. 50 Cong. Rec. 3849 (1913) quoted at Tellier, 383 U.S. at 691-92.
101. Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
102. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 27 (1958).
103. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
104. Id.
105. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 27 (1958).
106. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
107. Tellier, 383 U.S. at 694 (citations omitted).
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fines and penalties imposed upon them for violating state penal statutes;
to allow a deduction in those circumstances would have directly and
substantially diluted the actual punishment imposed."' '
Turning to the situation before it, the Court found that Mr. Tellier's
legal expenses were "far outside that sharply limited and carefully defined
category" of expenditures that ought to be judicially rendered
nondeductible on public policy grounds.'0 9  "No public policy is
offended," it said, "when a man faced with serious criminal charges
employs a lawyer to help in his defense."" Rather, it continued, "[i]n
an adversary system of criminal justice, it is a basic [sic] of our public
policy that a defendant in a criminal case have counsel to represent
him.""' To disallow the deduction because of a conviction, it
concluded, would be adding to the prescribed punishment "an additional
financial burden that Congress has neither expressly nor implicitly
directed.""' "We decline," said the Court, "to distort the income tax
laws to serve a purpose for which they were neither intended nor
designed by Congress."''1
3
Part IV - Section 162(f)
The law has changed in a vital respect since Tellier was decided.
With regard to ordinary and necessary business expenses, Congress has
replaced the "public policy" disallowance doctrine with specific rules that
preclude a deduction of certain kinds of expenditures that otherwise fit
within section 162(a). One of these disallowance rules is found in section
162(0. In this part, a number of issues that arise under 162(f) will be
examined, including: (a) whether civil, as well as criminal, exactions are
covered; (b) what is meant by "fine" and "penalty;" (c) what penalties are
"similar" to fines; (d) whether payments to third parties are covered;
(e) what is a "law" within the meaning of the section; and (f) whether
certain indirect exactions are covered.
A. Civil versus Criminal
The language of Section 162(f), "[n]o deduction shall be allowed
under . . . [section 162(a)] for any fine or similar penalty paid to a





112. Tellier, 383 U.S. at 694-95.
113. Id. (citations omitted).
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encompass civil, as well as criminal, fines and penalties." 4 The current
Treasury Regulations so provide" 5 and have consistently done so since
the initial proposed regulations issued in May, 1971.'6 A problem was
created, however, by the following language in the 1969 Senate Report
which may be read as indicating that section 162(f) was intended to apply
to only criminal fines and penalties:
This provision [section 162(f)] is to apply in any case in
which the taxpayer is required to pay a fine because he is
convicted of a crime (felony or misdemeanor) in'a full
criminal proceeding in an appropriate court. This
represents a codification of the general court position in
this respect." 7
The difficulties with a criminal-only application of Section 162(f)
were immediately noted," ' and in the course of amending Section
162(c) in the Revenue Act of 1971 " the Senate Finance Committee set
forth its earlier intent with respect to Section 162(f) in much more detail.
In connection with the proposed regulations relating
to the disallowance of deductions for fines and similar
penalties (section 162(f)), questions have been raised as to
whether the provision applies only to criminal "penalties"
or also to civil penalties as well. In approving the
provisions dealing with fines and similar penalties in 1969,
it was the intention of the committee to disallow
deductions for payments of sanctions which are imposed
under civil statutes but which in general terms serve the
same purpose as a fine exacted under a criminal statute.
The provision was intended to apply, for example, to
penalties provided for under the Internal Revenue Code in
the form of assessable penalties (subchapter B of chapter
68) as well as to additions to tax under the internal revenue
laws (subchapter A of chapter 68) in those cases where the
government has the fraud burden of proof (i.e., proof by
clear and convincing evidence). It was also intended that
114. I.R.C. § 162 (f) (1994).
115. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b) provides:
(b) Definition. (i) For purposes of this section a fine or similar penalty includes an
amount --
(ii) Paid as a civil penalty...
116. 36 Fed. Reg. 9637-9640 (proposed May 27, 1971).
117. S. Rep., supra note 4, 1969-3 C.B. at 597.
118. See Taggart, supra note 6.
119. Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497 (1971).
99 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1995
this rule should apply to similar type payments under the
laws of a State or other jurisdiction. 2 °
However, because post-enactment commentary is not necessarily
controlling,'2 ' the problem persists.
For the next several years, the cases by-and-large ignored the state
of the legislative record and simply held that civil penalties were within
the ambit of section 162(f). 22  One case noted the issue, but decided
not to resolve it.' 2a  Finally, the Claims Court in Adolf Meller Co. v.
United States 24 and the Tax Court in Southern Pacific Transportation
Co. v. Commissioner 25 dealt with the issue and both concluded that the
1971 Committee Report accurately reflected Congress' intent in enacting
section 162(f). Both courts acknowledged that legislative history
subsequent to enactment of a statute is ordinarily entitled to very little
weight. 126  Nonetheless, they were convinced that Congress intended to
codify the previous judicially developed public policy doctrine by
enacting section 162(f), and that the doctrine applied to both civil and
criminal sanctions. 127  Therefore, according to the courts, if the first
120. S. Rep. No. 437, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972-1 C.B. 559, 600.
121. See, e.g., Gwarthey of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundations, Inc., et al.,
484 U.S. 49, 63 (1987) ("Conclusions of 99th Congress, however, are hardly probative of the
intent of the 92d Congress."); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 87 n. 4 (1968) (holding that
views of subsequent Congress provide no controlling basis from which to infer purpose of earlier
Congress); Rain Water v. United States 356 U.S. 590, 593 (1957) (stating that amendment merely
expression of Congress' interpretation as such, subject to "little if any significance"); United
States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1959) ("[Tihe views of a subsequent congress form a
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one."). See also Adolf Meller Co. v. United
States, 600 F.2d 1360, 1363 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Estate of Stoll v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 223, 247
(1962).
122. See, e.g., May v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1114 (1976) (Code Section 6651(a)(2)
addition to Tax); Uhlenbrock v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 818 (1977) (Code Section 6651(a)
addition to Tax) This case refered to the 1971 Senate Finance Committee report, but for a
different issue. See id., 67 T.C. at 822 n.5.
In Tucker v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 675, 679 n.4 (1978), the Court noted the conflict
created by the legislative history, but left it unresolved.
123. Tucker, 69 T.C. at 679 n.4 (noting the conflict created by the legislative history, but
leaving if unresolved).
124. 600 F.2d 1360 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
125. 75 T.C. 497, 643 (1980).
126. AdolfMeller Co., 600 F.2d at 1363; Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 75 T.C. at 652 n.177.
While the Claims Court said such subsequent legislative history is entitled to "very limited
weight," the Tax Court stated it as "not necessarily controlling," which is presumably a less
negative characterization. AdolfMeller Co., 600 F.2d at 1363.
127. See also, AdolfMeller Co., 606 F.2d at 1363; Southern Pac.Transp. Co., 75 T.C. at
652-54; A.D. Juilliard & Co. Inc. v. Johnson, 259 F.2d 837, 844 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 942 (1959) (holding that civil treble damages for violation of Emergency Price Control Act);
McGraw-Edison Co. v. United States, 300 F.2d 453 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (dealing with penalty for
employing child labor); Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 173, 183
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sentence of the 1969 Committee Report quoted above limited section
162(f) to criminal fines and penalties, it was inconsistent with the next
sentence that said "[t]his represents a codification of the general court
position in this respect,"'' 28 and, at the very least, needed clarification.
In the courts' view, the 1971 Committee Report was consistent with the
pre-statute cases and therefore accurately clarified and reflected Congress'
intent in 1969.
Giving section 162(f) a criminal-only interpretation would also have
been inconsistent with the statutory language. As the courts pointed out,
section 162(f) did not explicitly limit its application to criminal fines and
penalties.29 Where such limitations were intended, Congress clearly
spelled them out as in section 162(g) and 162(c)(2) as originally
enacted. 30
Also, as noted in Adolf Meller, Congress amended section 162(c),
one of the companion provisions to section 162(f). 13' In doing so,
Congress specifically focused on the proposed regulation under section
162(f). This process essentually represents a reenactment by the 1971
Congress of section 162(f) thereby giving the Committe Report more
weight. 32 Moreover, as pointed out in True v. United States,33 the
1971 Senate Finance Committee had virtually the same membership as
the 1969 Committee, inasmuch as only two of its sixteen members had
changed.
134
Today, it is widely accepted that section 162(f) applies to civil and
criminal and penalties. 135  The more current issue is to determine what
types of civil penalties are within the "any fine or similar penalty"
language of section 162(f).
(1961) (dealing with payment for violation of New Jersey's minimum milk price provisions).
Criminal fines and penalties afortiori were within section 162(f) since Congress was codifying
the judicial public policy doctrine exemplified by Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356
U.S. 30 (1958) which involved criminal fines. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
128. S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong. 1st. Sess. 274 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423 at
597.
129. See, e.g., Adolf Meller Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 1360, 1363 (Ct. CI. 1979);
Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 497, 651 (1980).
130. See AdolfMeller Co., 600 F.2d at 1363. See also Taggart, supra note 6 at 622-23.
131. AdolfMeller Co., 600 F.2d at 1363.
132. Id.
133. 894 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990).
134. Id. at 1204 n.15.
135. See, e.g., True v. United States, 894 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990); Colt Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 880 F.2d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Also see the cases cited in the next section of the
text.
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B. "...Any Fine or Similar Penalty. .."
Before analyzing which civil exactions are within the phrase "any
fine or similar penalty," it is interesting to note that none of the tax cases
in this area have felt compelled to define the basic terms "fine" and
"penalty." In Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Commissioner,136
the Tax Court declined to accept the taxpayer's proposed definition that
a fine is an exaction due to a violation of a criminal statute while a
penalty is one imposed on account of a civil violation.'" The court
stated it was not convinced that the proposed distinction was appropriate,
pointing out that a recent case had not differentiated the terms in the
suggested manner, and that the regulations also made no such
distinction. a3 The court noted, however, that the Senate Report for the
Revenue Act of 1971 impliedly supported the proposed definition.'39
In a footnote, the court merely cited the dictionary definition of the
terms:
A penalty has been defined as "the suffering *** which is
annexed by law or judicial decision to the commission of
a crime or public offense ***; a sum of money made
recoverable in a civil action by the state *** for the less
serious offenses not mala in se"; whereas a fine is "a sum
formerly paid as compensation or for exemption from
punishment but now imposed as punishment for a crime --
distinguished from forfeiture and penalty."'40
A recent case added that both definitions include involuntary
payments,' 4 ' and other cases refused to adopt the Supreme Court's
determination of what constitutes a "penalty" for discharge in bankruptcy
purposes. 1
42
136. 75 T.C. 497 (1980).
137. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 75 T.C. at 650.
138. Id. The recent case referred to was Middle At. Distrib., Inc. v. Commissioners, 72
T.C. 1136, 1143 (1979), the other leading case in this area. Interestingly, the part of the Middle
Atlantic opinion cited did not attempt to define "fine" or "penalty," but merely distinguished
between those civil penalties that were within section 162(f) (and therefore not deductible) and
those that were outside of section 162(0 (and therefore deductible). For purposes of the case,
however, the Tax Court did accept the taxpayer's proposed definition because the Commissioner
never objected to it.
139. Id. at 650-51 n.175.
140. Id. quoting MERRIAN WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971).
141. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. 2672, 2681 (1992) (noting that
"penalty" and "fine" both involve involuntary payments).
142. See Misbin v. Commissioner, 50 T.L.M. 151 (1985); Patton v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.
389 (1978). Both cases rejected the Supreme Court's definition of "penalty" for discharge in
bankruptcy purposes.
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1. Punitive-versus-Remedial
The starting point for determining the scope of the phrase "any fine
or similar penalty," is the statutory language itself. The language of
section 162(f) suggests that fines are a broader category than penalties.
While all fines are included within the section 162(f) disallowance, the
same is not true for penalties; rather, only those penalties which are
"similar" to fines are included. Unfortunately, neither the statutory
language nor the regulations indicate the meaning of "similar."' 43
The leading case to address this issue is Southern Pacific
Transportation Co. v. Commissioner.'" In this case the taxpayer, a
railroad, incurred civil penalties for violating the Safety Appliance
Act "'45 and the Twenty-Eight Hour Act.11 6  The Safety Appliance Act
requires railroads engaged in interstate commerce to equip trains with
143. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21 (b) provides:
(b) Definition.
(1) For purposes of this section a fine or similar penalty includes an amount -
(i) Paid pursuant to conviction or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
for a crime (felony or misdemeanor) in a criminal proceeding;
(ii) Paid as a civil penalty imposed by Federal, State, or local law,
including additions to tax and additional amounts and assessable penalties imposed by chapter 68
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954;
(iii) Paid in settlement of the taxpayer's actual or potential liability for
a fine or penalty (civil or criminal); or
(iv) Forfeited as collateral posted in connection with a proceeding
which could result in imposition of such a fine or penalty.
(2) The amount of a fine or penalty does not include legal fees and related
expenses paid or incurred in the defense of a prosecution or civil action arising from a violation
of the law imposing the fine or civil penalty, nor court costs assessed against the taxpayer, or
stenographic and printing charges. Compensatory damages (including damages under section 4A
of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15a), as amended paid to a government do not constitute a fine or
penalty.
144. 75 T.C. 497 (1980). Southern Pacific was actually the second Tax Court case to focus
on what a "similar" penalty means. The first was Middle Ad. Distrib., Inc. v. Commissioner, 72
T.C. 1136 (1979), which was decided 15 months earlier. While Middle Atlantic is sometimes
referred to as the leading case, (see, e.g., supra note 48), Southern Pacific deals with the issue in
much more detail than Middle Atlantic does. In addition, it seems to this author that Southern
Pacific is cited more often on this issue than Middle Atlantic. In any event, the two cases arrive
at the same result
145. 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
146. 45 U.S.C. §§ 71-74 (1994).
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specified operating and safety equipment and to keep such equipment in
good operating condition. 47 The Twenty-Eight Hour Act provides that
animals being transported in interstate commerce cannot be confined for
a period in excess of twenty-eight hours (or longer under certain
circumstances) without unloading the animals into pens for at least five
hours for rest, water and feeding."4"
The court found that the taxpayer used all due care in attempting to
comply with both laws and that the violations were unavoidable.'49
The court also found that similar violations are commonly incurred by the
railroad industry in general and that they constituted ordinary and
necessary expenses of engaging in the railroad business.50 The
taxpayer argued that these penalties were not disallowed by section 162(f)
because they were not "similar" to fines imposed by criminal statutes."'
The Tax Court agreed that the literal language of section 162(f)
implies that there are some penalties that do not fall within the scope of
section 162(f), and that the word "similar" in the statute must be given
some effect.'52 Since the wording of the statute does not make the
meaning altogether clear, and, since the regulations make no distinction
between penalties based upon the word "similar," the court looked to the
legislative history to discover the meaning intended by Congress. 53 As
a starting point, the Tax Court noted that the 1969 Senate Report was
both "cryptic and somewhat ambiguous.""' 5 However, it recognized
that Congress was attempting to codify the pre-1969 general judicial
position on the deductibility of fines and penalties.'55 Two years later,
in connection with the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1971, the Senate
Finance Committee clarified its intentions from 1969. 1 6  It did not
intend to limit the disallowance of section 162(f) to criminal penalties.
Rather, its "intent was to 'disallow deductions for payments of sanctions
which are imposed under civil statutes but which in general terms serve
the same purpose as a fine exacted under a criminal statute."" 57 The
147. Southern Pac. Transp., 75 T.C. at 647.
148. Id. at 647
149. Id. at 648.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 650-51. The taxpayer also argued that section 1.162-21(b)(1)(ii) of the
regulations was invalid because it disallowed a deduction for all civil penalties without
differentiating "similar" from non-similar ones. Id.





157. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 875 T.C. at 651-52, quoting S. Rep. No. 92-437, 92d Cong.
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court went on to quote the following paragraph from the 1971 Senate
Finance Committee Report:
On the other hand, it was not intended that deductions be
denied in the case of sanctions imposed to encourage
prompt compliance with requirements of law. Thus, many
jurisdictions impose "penalties" to encourage prompt
compliance with filing or other requirements which are
really more in the nature of late filing charges or interest
charges than they are fines. It was not intended that this
type of sanction be disallowed under the 1969 action.
Basically, in this area, the committee did not intend to
liberalize the law in the case of fines and penalties.' 58
In summarizing the legislative history and its understanding of
section 162(0, the Tax Court stated:
Thus, Congress, by use of the word "similar," was not
intending to distinguish between criminal and civil
sanctions, but rather was intending to make a distinction
between different types of civil penalties. If a civil penalty
is imposed for purposes of enforcing the law and as
punishment for the violation thereof, its purpose is the
same as a fine exacted under a criminal statute and it is
"1similar" to a fine. However, if the civil penalty is
imposed to encourage prompt compliance with a
requirement of the law, or as a remedial measure to
compensate another party for expenses incurred as a result
of the violation, it does not serve the same purpose as a
criminal fine and is not "similar" to a fine within the
meaning of section 162(0....'.
Applying these standards to the facts in Southern Pacific, the 'Fax
Court held that the civil penalties incurred by the taxpayer were within
section 162(0 and were, thus, not deductible. 60 The purpose of the
Safety Appliance Act and Twenty-Eight Hour Act penalties was to
enforce the law and punish violations thereof. The taxpayer's attempt to
distinguish these penalties from criminal fines on the ground that the
taxpayer's actions were not inherently reprehensible conduct, as criminal
conduct normally is, was not accepted by the court. The appropriate
1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972-3 C.B. at 600.
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consideration is not the type of conduct that gives rise to the penalties,
but the purpose that the statutory penalties serve. 6'
With the exception of one case,'62 and despite some minor
variations in the precise formulation used,'63 the punitive-versus-
remedial distinction set forth in Southern Pacific has been followed by
the Tax Court,'" other courts 6 ' and the Internal Revenue
Service.'6 6 This approach also resembles the approach taken in the pre-
1969 public policy cases.
67
Before analyzing some of the issues that arise in applying Southern
Pacific's punitive-versus-remedial dichotomy with respect to civil
penalties, it is important to resolve one of the loose ends raised, but not
resolved, by the decision. In Southern Pacific the taxpayer challenged
the validity of section 1.162-21 (b)(l)(ii) of the regulations, which defines
161. Id.
162. Colt Indus., Inc. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Despite all of the
cases to the contrary cited infra notes 126-27, the Federal Circuit read the legislative history
exactly the opposite way:
The [1971 Senate Finance] committee's comments were to clarify that civil
penalties, as well as criminal, are within the ambit of section 162(o, not an effort to
distinguish between deductible and nondeductible civil penalties .... To the extent
that it recognized an exception to the nondeductibility of civil penalties, the
committee said only that the deduction of 'late filing charges or interest charges'
imposed 'to encourage prompt compliance with filing or other requirements' is not
barred.
Id. at 1313. Colt has been criticized for a number of reasons. See Edwin G. Torres, Note,
Deductions of Civil Penalties Under Section 162(): Colt Industries, Inc. v. United States, 43
TAx LAW 823, 828-35 (1990).
163. See, e.g., Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667, 672 (2d Cir. 1990) (discussing
punitive versus compensatory); True v. United States, 894 F.2d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 1990)
(referring to retributive versus compensatory or remedial). See also Andrews, supra note 48, at
315 n.307.
164. See, e.g, Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 2672, 2682 (1992); Waldman v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1384, 1387 (1987); Henson Robinson Co. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M.
508, 509 (1984); Huff v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 804, 821 (1983).
165. See, e.g., Stephens v . Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667, 672 (2d Cir. 1990); True v.
United States, 894 F.2d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 1990); Bailey v. Commissioner, 756 F.2d 44, 46
(6th Cir. 1985). See also Colt Indus., Inc. v. United States, II Cl. Ct. 140, (1986), affd with
other reasoning, 880 F.2d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
166. In several public revenue rulings, the Internal Revenue Service has impliedly followed
the punitive/remedial dichotomy by equating nondeductibility with the punitive nature of a
violation. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 88-46, 1988-1 C.B. 76, 77, and Rev. Rul. 78-196, 1978-1 C.B. 45.
However, the reliance upon this dichotomy is much more explicit in its private letter rulings.
See, e.g., P.L.R. 8708004 & P.L.R. 8704003.
While the Internal Revenue Code section 6110(9)(3) states that private letter rulings may
not be used or cited as precedent, the Supreme Court has indicated that they may serve as
evidence of the Internal Revenue Service's administrative position. Rowan Co., Inc. v. United
States, 452 U.S. 247, 261 n.17. They are being used herein for this limited purpose.
167. See, e.g., Business Expenses, supra note 33, at 120.
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a fine or similar penalty as "a civil penalty imposed by Federal, State or
local law" without any qualification to reflect the statute's use of the
word "similar."' 6 While the court avoided this issue by not relying on
the regulation in reaching its decision, the taxpayer's point seems valid.
In True v. United States,6g a case involving the deductibility of a civil
penalty imposed under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the
taxpayer raised the same argument. The Tenth Circuit agreed that
"[t]aken literally and in isolation" the regulation seems invalid. However,
when read in conjunction with section 1.162-21(b)(2), which provides
that "[c]ompensatory damages... paid to a government do not constitute
a fine or penalty," the regulations affirm that compensatory (i.e.
remedial), civil sanctions remain deductible. 7 °  Therefore, the
regulation, when read in conjunction with section 1.162-21 (b)(2), is valid.
a. Whose Intent
In applying the punitive-versus-remedial dichotomy to determine the
deductibility of civil penalties, the initial concern is discerning exactly
whose intent is relevant. Normally, some statute will authorize the
imposition of the civil penalty at issue, and an administrative official or
judge will actually impose the penalty. Whose intent is controlling? The
statute's or the imposer's? What if there is conflicting intent? For
instance, if a judge is so angered at a particular wrongdoer that, despite
the fact that the statute is generally remedial and not punitive, what if the
judge "throws the book" at the wrongdoer in order to punish this
scoundrel?
As strange as it may sound, none of the cases have explicitly
focused on this issue. Just as Supreme Court Justice Stewart may know
obscenity when he sees it,' 7' in these cases the courts seem to know on
whom to focus. In some cases, the focus is on the statute'72 while in
others it is on the judge.'73 In all fairness to the process, in the vast
168. 75 T.C. at 649.
169. 894 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990).
170. Id. at 1204. Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit noted that the regulations could be read to
make nondeductible the purely procedural violations that Congress had intended to exclude from
section 162(0. However, since the case did not involve such a procedural infraction, the court
did not address the issue. Id. at 1204 n. 18. Presumably, the regulations could be subject to
challenge in an appropriate case.
171. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1962) (Stewart, J., concurring).
172. See, e.g. True v. United States, 894 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990); Mason and Dixon
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 708 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1983); S & B Restaurant, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1226 (1980); Middle Ad. Distrib., Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1136
(1979). See also Rev. Proc. 92-91, 1992-2 C.B. 503; Rev. Rul. 88-46, 1988-1 C.B. 76.
173. See, e.g., Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1990); Allied-Signal, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. 2672 (1992).
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majority of these cases, the focus hits the appropriate target, even if the
court does not adequately explain why it selected that particular target.
As a starting point, the Southern Pacific case itself focused upon the
underlying statute. In response to the taxpayer's contention that section
162(f) should only apply to penalties imposed on conduct that is
inherently reprehensible and similar to criminal conduct, the court
responded that "the appropriate consideration is not the type of conduct
which gives rise to the violation resulting in the penal imposition but is
the purpose which the statutory penalty is to serve."'7 4 Later the court
added, "petitioner committed violations of both... [statutes]. Each statute
evidences a defined public policy and imposes a civil penalty as
retribution for a violation of that policy,"' 75 again focusing on the
statute itself.
Where the underlying statute is federal the tax tribunal should
attempt to determine the purpose of the statute from its language,
pertinent legislative history and, of course, available precedent. 76 If a
state statute controls, these same factors are, of course, relevant.'77
However, under principles laid down by the Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 7' if the state's highest court has
decided the nature of the statute, its ruling should be dispositive.'79
1) Dual Purpose Statutes
Often a statute will have many purposes, some of which are punitive
while others are remedial. In these dual purpose situations the Tenth
Circuit and the Tax Court differ on how to proceed. Ig True v. United
States,' the Tenth Circuit was faced with determining the deductibility
of a civil penalty imposed under section 31 l(b)(6) of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act.' After analyzing all of the punitive and
remedial features, the court decided that "on balance" the provision serves
a deterrent and retributive function similar to a fine.' On several
174. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 75 T.C. at 653.
175. Id. at 654.
176. See, e.g., True v. United States, 894 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990); Middle Ad. Distrib.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1136 (1970); Rev. Proc. 92-91, 1992-2 C.B. 503; Rev. Rul. 88-46,
1988-1 C.B. 76.
177. See, e.g., Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc. v. United States, 708 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1983)
(dealing with Virginia's limit on vehicle weight); S & B Restaurant, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73
T.C. 1226 (1980) (addressing Pennsylvania's Clean Streams Law).
178. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
179. See, e.g., Waldman v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1384 (1987); Huff v. Commissioner, 80
T.C. 804 (1983); Henson Robinson Co. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. 508 (1984).
180. 894 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990).
181. 33. U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (Supps. 11 1972).
182. True, 894 F.2d at 1205.
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occasions"8 3 when faced with dual purpose statutes, the Tax Court did
not attempt to weigh the various factors and come up with an overall
characterization of the statute. Instead, it defined its role as having to
decide only what was the character of the particular penalty under
consideration. "Where a payment ultimately serves each of these
purposes, i.e., law enforcement (nondeductible) and compensation
(deductible), the court's task is to determine which purpose the payment
was designated to serve."'8 4 In making this determination, the intent
of the judge or of the official imposing the penalty becomes crucial.'85
2) Parties' Characterization
Another factor that may be either relevant, or perhaps controlling,
is whether the involved parties have entered into an agreement
characterizing the penalty payment. In Middle Atlantic Distributors, Inc.
v. Commissioner,8 6 the United States Customs Service initially sought
over $500,000 from the taxpayer as a "penalty or liquidated damages"
under 19 U.S.C. section 1592. The action arose because a Turkish
official withdrew liquor from the taxpayer's warehouse under false
pretenses. Instead of using the liquor for members of the Turkish armed
forces, in which event no import duties or alcohol taxes were due, the
official defrauded both the taxpayer and the government and injected the
liquor into United States commerce. In the course of settling the matter,
the taxpayer offered $100,000 "as liquidated damages, in order to
reimburse the Government for all or a portion of the taxes to which it
asserts a claim."'87  The government accepted the offer. 8  After
determining that section 1592 was a dual purpose provision and that the
court had to decide the purpose for this particular payment, the Tax Court
emphasized the characterization contained in the settlement
agreement. 8 9 Following a pre-1969 case,' 90 the Tax Court stated that
"[o]nce again, we conclude that the characterization of the pdyment as
damages by the parties must be given effect".'9 ' Similarly, Revenue
183. See Waldman v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1384, 1387 (1987), affid, 850 F.2d 611 (9th
Cir. 1988); S & B Restaurant, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1226, 1232 (1980); Middle Ad.
Distrib., Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1136, 1145 (1979).
184. Waldman, 88 T.C. at 1387.
185. See supra note 135.
186. 72 T.C. 1136 (1979).
187. Id. at 1140.
188. Id.
189. Middle At. Distrib., 72 T.C. at 1145.
190. Grossman & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 15 (1967).
191. Middle Ad. Distrib., 72 T.C. at 1146.
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Ruling 80-334'92 held that the I.R.S. would accept a characterization in
a consent order between the Department of Energy and a petroleum
company under its jurisdiction that payments to be made were not
penalties, but merely refunds of unintentional overcharge and, therefore,
deductible.
It should be emphasized that in Middle Atlantic, the Tax Court stated
that it would give effect to the parties' characterization after it had
determined that the statute involved was a dual purpose one.'93
Therefore, it does not follow that such a characterization will govern in
the face of a single purpose statute to the contrary.
194
3) Case-law Application
In discerning whose intent is relevant to determine the punitive or
remedial question, three cases are especially noteworthy. Two of the
cases, Stephens v. Commissioner 95  and Allied-Signal, Inc. v.
Commissioner,196 are important because they focus solely upon the
judge's intent. The third case Colt Industries, Inc. v. United States,97
is important because the Federal Circuit marched to the beat of a different
drummer by considering the statute's intent differently from other
circuits.
In Stephens, the taxpayer and others had defrauded Raytheon by
embezzling money from it.' 98 In 1982, the taxpayer was convicted of
four counts of wire fraud, one count of transporting the proceeds of fraud
in interstate commerce, and one count of conspiracy. At the sentencing,
the Assistant United States Attorney alerted the court that the money the
taxpayer had embezzled was frozen in a Bermuda bank account and
suggested that the court order the taxpayer to make restitution. The
sentencing judge agreed and, in sentencing the taxpayer, imposed a fine
and concurrent five-year prison sentence for all the counts other than the
interstate transportation of the proceeds of fraud count. On this latter
count, in addition to a fine, the court imposed a consecutive five-year
prison term, which was suspended and probation was substituted on
192. 80-2 C.B. 61.
193. Middle Atd. Distrib., 72 T.C. at 1145.
194. It should be noted that there are instances where the parties to a settlement or consent
order provide what the tax consequences of the payment will be. See, e.g. United States v.
Western Ele. Co., Inc., 1991-1 Trade Cases 69,329 at p. 65,267 (D.D.C. 1991) ("The civil
penalty provided for ... [herein] shall be deemed not to be a deductible expense for income tax
purposes"); United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1545-46 (8th Cir.
1984). Presumably, such a characterization of nondeductibility will govern.
195. 905 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1990).
196. 63 T.C.M. 2672 (1992).
197. 880 F.2d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
198. Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667, 668 (2d Cir. 1990).
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condition that the taxpayer make restitution of $1 million to Raytheon.
In 1984 Stephens made the restitution payment. Since Stephens had
previously included the $1 million in his income for 1976, he claimed a
deduction for the 1984 restitution payment under section 165(c)(2). 9 9
The Commissioner denied the deduction, arguing, inter alia, that section
162(f) precluded the deduction. Although the Tax Court below200 and
the Second Circuit2 ' both held that the deduction was governed by
section 165(c)(2) and not by section 162(a), each nevertheless decided
that the principles of section 162(f) were relevant in determining whether
to disallow the deduction on public policy grounds under section 165.202
In reversing the Tax Court and permitting the deduction, the Second
Circuit focused only upon the judge's intent in requiring restitution.2"3
It focused on the sentencing proceedings and ultimately determined that
the nature of the restitution payment was more compensatory than
punitive and was primarily a remedial measure to compensate another
party.20 4 The Second Circuit never focused on the nature of the
underlying statute.20 5
If one were to attempt to reconcile the Second Circuit's opinion in
Stephens and Southern Pacific's focus on the underlying statute, one
slight opening exists in the Stephens' analysis. In presenting the punitive-
versus-remedial dichotomy, the Stephens court quoted from Waldman v.
Commissioner.2"6 In Waldman, the court said that "'[w]here a payment
ultimately serves each of these purposes, i.e., law enforcement
(nondeductible) and compensation (deductible), our task is to determine
which purpose the payment was designed to serve."' 2 7  Perhaps this
statement could be interpreted as an implicit finding by the court that the
underlying statute in Stephens had a dual purpose and, therefore, an
inquiry into the judge's intent in imposing this particular payment is
consistent with the dual purpose cases. Unfortunately, the quote is used
199. Id. at 669. Code section 165(c)(2) allows a deduction for losses incurred in a
transaction entered into for profit. I.RC. §165(c)(2) (1994).
200. 93 T.C. 108, 111-12 (1989).
201. Stephens, 905 F.2d at 670.
202. 93 T.C. at 112; 905 F.2d at 672.
203. Stephens, 905 F.2d 672-73.
204. Id.
205. The Tax Court's disposition of the case arguably was more consistent with Southern
Pacific's focus on the statute. The Tax Court held the restitution was not deductible because it
was made as a result of a criminal conviction, in lieu of a prison term and as a condition of
probation. 93 T.C. at 113. Implicitly, the Tax Court was focusing upon the criminal nature of
the underlying statute involved. See infra notes 186-234 and accompanying text.
206. 88 T.C. 1384, 1387 (1987), affd, 850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1988).
207. Stephens, 905 F.2d at 673.
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more as an exposition of the punitive-versus-remedial standard than as an
application to Stephens' facts.
Although it is not completely clear whether Stephens relied on the
statute's intent, Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Commissioner2 8 did not consider
statutory intent. In Allied-Signal, the taxpayer pled nolo contendere to
an indictment that contained 940 counts of discharging Kepone and other
toxic wastes into the environment in Hopewell, Virginia. Initially, the
judge imposed the maximum fine of $13.24 million dollars on the
taxpayer. The Tax Court found that the judge made his intent very clear
at sentencing:
"Allied knew it was polluting the waters." In addition to
punishing petitioner, the sentencing judge wanted to send
a message to other corporations. He stated "I hope after
this sentence, that every corporate official, every corporate
employee that has any reason to think that pollution is
going on, will think, 'If I don't do something about it now,
I am apt to be out of a job tomorrow.' I want the officials
to be concerned when they see it."2'9
The judge then reiterated an earlier wish that the fines could be used to
directly benefit the people who had been hurt by the taxpayer's actions.
Unfortunately, the judge felt that this desire could not be accomplished.
He ordered the fine paid in ninety days, but indicated that he might then
entertain a motion to reduce the fine.2'0  The taxpayer obtained tax
advice and was informed by several sources that if it took voluntary
remedial action, such as contributing to a foundation to engage in
research to eradicate Kepone from the environment, it would have a
"good shot" at obtaining a tax deduction for the payment.21 ' However,
the taxpayer did not want to make such a payment without assurance that
its fine would be reduced dollar-for-dollar. A number of contacts were
then had by the taxpayer's attorneys and the judge designed to assure the
taxpayer that any "voluntary" payment would in fact result in an
abatement of the fine. Although the judge always emphasized that he
could not give any binding assurances, eventually the taxpayer was
virtually certain that any such "voluntary" payments would be
appropriately recognized at the hearing on the motion to reduce the fine.
Accordingly, the taxpayer established the Virginia Environmental
Endowment Fund (hereinafter the "Fund"), a section 501(c)(4)
208. 63 T.C.M. 2672 (1992).
209. Id. at 2677.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 2677-78.
RESTITUTION PAYMENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL FINES
organization and contributed $8 million to the Fund. As anticipated, at
the hearing on the motion to reduce the fine, the judge reduced the fine
from $13.24 million to $5 million."' On behalf of the Department of
Justice, the local United States Attorney objected and argued that the
taxpayer would probably try to claim a tax deduction for the payment to
the Fund and would, thereby, effectively reduce the effect of the fine and
its intended penal and deterrent purpose." 3
In reaching a decision on the deductibility of the $8 million payment
to the Fund, the Tax Court never focused on the punitive or remedial
nature of the underlying statute.214 In fact, the opinion never cites the
underlying statute that was violated. To the extent that intent was
focused on, it was solely the judge's intent. After quoting from the
Waldman case,2"' the Tax Court stated that the trial judge's statements
indicated that there may have been a dual purpose for his imposition, and
the Tax Court's job was to determine which purpose the payment in
question was designed to serve. Based on the facts, the Tax Court had
no trouble deciding that any compensatory or remedial purpose for the
payment was minimal, and that the payment was essentially for
punishment and deterrence for environmental crimes.
2 ,6
One curious aspect of the Allied-Signal case is that the taxpayer, in
addition to its federal fine and payment, also settled with Virginia and the
City of Hopewell for $5.25 million. 27 This payment was "for Kepone-
related costs that... [Virginia and Hopewell] incurred and the penalties
assessed by the Virginia Water Control Board. The settlement covered
damages to ... Hopewell's waste treatment system as well as the expense
borne by .. .[Virginia] with regard to the Kepone incident., 21 Since
penalties were involved, one would have expected the I.R.S. to challenge
the deductibility of at least a portion of this amount. Surprisingly, it did
not. The I.R.S. agreed with the taxpayer's deduction of the entire $5.25
million under section 162(a).219
From a policy standpoint, one may wonder what would and should
occur if a taxpayer in Allied-Signal's position did in fact take its chances
and make a truly voluntary payment that the judge later expressly took
into account by imposing a fine lower than otherwise would have been
212. Id. at 2680. The extra $240,000 was a bonus given to the taxpayer. Id. at 2679.
213. Allied-Signal, Inc., 63 T.C.M. at 2679.
214. Id at 2672.
215. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
216. Allied-Singnal, Inc. 63 T.C.M at 2683.
217. Id. at 2680.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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imposed. Unlike in Allied-Signal, there would be no question of
conversion of a definite fine into something else. However, the bottom
line might be exactly the same.
In Colt Industries, Inc. v. United States,220 the taxpayer's affiliated
subsidiary corporation, Crucible, Inc., manufactured basic and fabricated
steel products in Midland, Pennsylvania. It was subject to a number of
environmental protection laws and regulations, including the Federal
Clean Air Act, the Federal Clean Water Act, the Pennsylvania State
Implementation Plan, and the rules and regulations of the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Resources. 22' Beginning in 1976 and
continuing thereafter, the Environmental Protection Agency determined
that Crucible was in violation of a number of pertinent environmental
laws. It eventually recommended that suit be instituted against Crucible
for civil penalties of $25,000 per day for the violation of the Clean Air
Act and $10,000 per day for the violation of the Clean Water Act. A
settlement was eventually reached and a consent decree was entered
whereby Crucible paid $1.6 million to the Pennsylvania Clean Air and
Clean Water Funds in satisfaction of the civil penalties, which were
sought by the Environmental Protection Agency. The taxpayer claimed
a deduction for this payment under section 162(a), and the I.R.S.
disallowed the deduction under section 162(f).
The Claims Court below held that a deduction was unavailable
because the pertinent provisions of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts
were punitive and not compensatory. In arriving at its decision the
Claims Court adopted and applied the Southern Pacific analysis and
reached its decision only after ascertaining the intent of the statutes
involved.223
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court, however,
the court's reasoning is very unusual. Initially, as noted above, the
Federal Circuit read the 1971 Senate Finance Committee Report
differently than every other court that focused upon the report. 24 It
then went on to decline Colt's invitation to determine the purpose
(whether punitive or remedial) of the $1.6 million payment involved.
The argument is also unacceptable because, as a necessary predicate
according to Colt, the court would have to "determine the purpose or
purposes served by the specific civil penalty payment at issue in order
220. 880 F.2d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
221. Id. at 1312.
222. Colt Indus., Inc. v. United States, 86-2 U.S.T.C. 9749 (Cl. Ct. 1986).
223. Colt Indus., Inc., 880 F.2d at 1312 (interpreting 86-2 U.S.T.C. at 85841-44).
224. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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to ascertain whether the payment is barred from deduction." But that
is not our office; "Congress has delegated to the Commissioner, not
to the courts, the task of prescribing 'all needful rules and regulations
for the enforcement' of the Internal Revenue Code .... In this area
of limitless factual variations, 'it is the province of Congress and the
Commissioner, not the courts, to make the appropriate adjustments.'
S.. (citations omitted)
As is apparent, neither the statute nor the regulations prescribe a
"purpose" inquiry. It is therefore beyond our mandate to embark on
one to make our own assessment of the deductibility of a particular
penalty. "The role of the judiciary in cases of this sort begins and
ends with assuring that the Commissioner's regulations fall within his
authority to implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable
manner."
2 5
Apparently, under the Federal Circuit's view, and contrary to every
other court that has addressed the issue, a purpose inquiry is never
necessary. A court must merely decide if a regulation is valid. If it is,
the court is to go no further. The court is not even to determine if the
application of the regulation to the facts involved is appropriate. Notice
that the role of the judiciary is very limited under this approach. To date,
no other court has adopted this limited view of the court's role.226
b. Factors Considered
In determining whether a civil penalty is deductible, a court needs
to decide if the penalty's purpose is punitive, remedial, or compensatory.
This decision will be based on all available relevant material, whether it
be the pertinent legislative history,227 a definitive ruling by a state's
highest court,228 the record of what a sentencing judge said in imposing
the penalty, 2 9 or something else. Although the courts in this area have
not yet used the phrase, this seems to be but another manifestation of the
multi-purpose "facts and circumstances" test. As such, it is usually futile
to attempt to delineate the factors that have been considered by the
various courts, since, by definition, there are no artificial boundaries.
Rather, anything relevant can and should be considered. However, a
number of factors have arisen in certain cases that have some logical
relevance in reaching the required decision. This portion of the article
225. Colt Indus., Inc., 880 F.2d at 1312.
226. See Torres, supra note 162.
227. See supra note 138.
228. See supra note 141.
229. See, e.g., Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667, 673 (2d Cir. 1990); Allied-Signal,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. 2672 (1992).
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will briefly focus on these factors. Notably, most of the factors are not,
or may not be, conclusive in and of themselves, except perhaps for the
first factor of whether the penalty arose in a criminal case or is in-lieu of
criminal punishment. This is because often there are multiple factors
present to justify the court's decision.
1) Penalties Arising in Criminal Cases or In Lieu of Criminal
Punishment.
A line of Tax Court cases appear to hold that a penalty imposed in
a criminal case or in lieu of a criminal punishment is automatically non-
deductible under section 162(f). In Huff v. Commissioner,230 the
taxpayer was an employee, officer, and director of a business engaged in
an illegal pyramid type of operation. In a judgment entered on January
14, 1971 and pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, the
corporations involved were enjoined from making certain false or
misleading representations. By its terms, this judgment extended to the
taxpayer. Subsequently, an action was brought against the corporations
and a number of their employees and officers, including the taxpayer,
alleging that the final judgment in the prior action had been violated.
After a trial, the taxpayer was found guilty of violating the prior
judgment and also of violating a section of California's Business and
Professions Code, which prohibited the making of false or misleading
statements. The second action, however, was a civil, non-criminal
action."' In addition certain other relief, the taxpayer was ordered to
pay to the State of California a civil penalty of $50,000, the deductibility
of which under section 162(f) was before the court.232
The taxpayer argued that the phrase "similar penalty," used in
section 162(f), encompassed only civil penalties imposed in criminal or
quasi-criminal proceedings.233 The basis for this argument was the
language in the Senate Finance Committee Report on the Revenue Act of
1971 quoted previously.234  Although the court did not accept this
argument and ultimately held that the penalty was nondeductible because
its purpose was to penalize for past illegal behavior,235 the court stated
230. 80 T.C. 804 (1983).
231. Id. at 809-810.
232. Id. at 813. The taxpayer's employer paid the $50,000 penalty. Id. at 812-13,
However, after the court held that the employer's payment of the penalty constituted gross
income to the taxpayer, the issue then became whether the penalty was deductible under section
162(f).
233. Huff, 80 T.C. at 822.
234. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
235. Huff, 80 T.C. at 824.
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that "[i]nsofar as petitioners suggest that civil penalties imposed in
criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings fall within the term 'similar
penalty' used in section 162(f), we agree.
236
Although the Tax Court in Huff never states its reasons for arriving
at the conclusion that all penalties imposed in criminal or quasi-criminal
proceedings are within section 162(f), it is presumably derived from the
fact that the nondeductibility of criminal fines was always more certain
than the nondeductibility of civil penalties. When the civil penalty arises
out of a criminal case, it is perhaps inherently more "similar" to a fine.
The next Tax Court case to address this issue provides a very clear
additional reason for this result, namely section 1.162-21(b)(1)(i). In
Waldman v. Commissioner,237 the taxpayer was charged with twenty-
nine counts of conspiracy to commit grand theft. He pled guilty to one
count, and the remaining counts were dismissed. He was sentenced to
one-to-ten years in prison, but execution of the sentence was stayed on
condition he pay specified amounts of restitution to his victims. In 198 1,
the taxpayer paid $28,500 in restitution and deducted this amount on his
tax return. The I.R.S. disallowed the deduction. As a result, the
deductibility of the restitution payment under section 162(f) was before
the court.238
Although neither party referred to the regulations, the Tax Court
held that section 1.162-21(b)(1)(i) of the regulations was dispositive.
39
That section provides that a fine or similar penalty includes an amount
paid pursuant to a conviction or plea of guilty in any criminal proceeding.
The court reasoned that the taxpayer's restitution was paid pursuant to his
plea of guilty and, thus, fit within the regulation's definition of fine or
similar penalty. Had the taxpayer pled not guilty and had he
subsequently been acquitted, the restitution payment would never have
been ordered.24°
Subsequently, Stephens v. Commissioner24' focused not just on the
fact that the penalty was imposed in a criminal case, but also on the fact
that it was in lieu of an additional criminal punishment. In this case, as
was previously described in more detail, 242 the taxpayer had embezzled
236. Id. at 822.
237. 88 T.C. 1384 (1987), aff'd, 850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1988).
238. Id at 1385-86.
239. Id at 1387.
240. Id. at 1386-87. Since the parties had argued the case under the punitive-versus-
remedial rubric, the Tax Court also addressed this argument and found that the penalty involved
was punitive. Id. at 1387-88.
241. 93 T.C. 108 (1989), rev'd, 905 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1990).
242. See supra notes 155-164, and accompanying text.
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money from Raytheon. In addition to sentencing the taxpayer to several
concurrent five-year prison terms and substantial fines, the judge imposed
an additional consecutive five-year prison term and a fine on one of the
counts and suspended this prison term and substituted probation on
condition the taxpayer make restitution.243 In finding the restitution
payment nondeductible under section 162(f), the Tax Court stated:
It is equally clear that the restitution payment involved herein was
made as the result of a criminal conviction and that it was ordered in
lieu of an additional prison term and as a condition of probation.
That the payment had the effect of reimbursing Raytheon for all or
part of its loss and, therefore, had a civil aspect, does not detract from
this overriding fact.244
Interestingly, in Stephens and Waldman, both courts cited section
1.162-21 (b) (1) (i) of the regulations as authority for holding that the
taxpayer's restitution payment was not an allowable deduction.24 It
would appear, however, that when a civil penalty is imposed in lieu of
a criminal penalty, the language of clause (iii) of the regulation is more
fitting. It is an amount "paid in settlement of the taxpayer's actual or
potential liability for a fine ... (civil or criminal)." An earlier Revenue
Ruling246 relied on this regulation in a very similar "in lieu of'
situation.
In Revenue Ruling 79-148 the taxpayer was a manufacturer who
sold certain products to Country X. A federal district court held that the
sales violated federal law, which restricted sales of such products to
Country X. The taxpayer pled nolo contendere to the charges. Before
sentencing, the taxpayer offered to contribute to a local charity an amount
equal to the maximum fine that the federal court could impose for the
violation. The taxpayer was sentenced but the sentence was suspended,
and the taxpayer was placed on two years probation and directed to pay
the proffered amount to the charity.247 Relying on regulation section
1.162-21(b)(1)(iii), the I.R.S. ruled that the amount paid to the charity
was not deductible under section 162(f) because the payment was in lieu
of the taxpayer having to pay a fine to the federal government.
4 8
243. Stephens, 93 T.C. at 109.
244. Id. at 113 (citation omitted).
245. See Waldnan, 88 T.C. at 1387.
246. Rev. Rul. 79-148, 1979-1 C.B. 93.
247. Id. The Revenue Ruling does not describe the specifics of the original sentence that
was ultimately suspended.
248. Id. at 94.
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The final Tax Court case to be considered in accordance with this
line of cases is Allied-Signal Inc. v. Commissioner.249 As discussed
previously,250 in sentencing the taxpayer for environmental crimes the
court reduced the original $13.24 million fine to $5 million as a
consequence of the taxpayer having made a voluntary $8 million
contribution to a fund established to deal with local environmental
concerns. In deciding that the $8 million payment was not deductible,
the Tax Court reasoned that the contribution was not voluntary, since it
was made with the virtual assurance that any amount contributed would
reduce the criminal fine dollar for dollar.25" ' Also the Tax Court found
that the judge's purpose in imposing the original sentence was almost
entirely punitive. 2
Notwithstanding the taxpayer's argument that the $8 million
contribution was not within section 162(f) because it was not ordered by
the sentencing judge as part of the sentence nor was it imposed as a
condition for reducing the sentence, the Tax Court found that this was
essentially the payment of a fine. The Tax Court observed that "[w]hile
the form of the payment [did] not necessarily fit within the letter of
section 162(f), in substance petitioner paid a criminal fine." '253 If by
this statement, the court meant that the payment was in lieu of a fine,
then the case is consistent with the Huff-Waldman-Stephens line of cases.
However, the court continued by asserting that the contribution was a
mere device to obtain a deduction for an amount not otherwise
deductible. The court then quotes Gregory v. Helvering,254  and
apparently supports its holding here on that case's "substance over form"
doctrine. The obvious question is why didn't the court simply hold the
payment taxable based on the Huff-Waldman-Stephens line of cases,
especially since the payment arose out of a criminal case and was in lieu
of a criminal fine?
The Ninth and Sixth Circuits follow the Huff- Waldman-Stephens line
of cases while the Second and Tenth Circuits do not. There is also a
district court case in the Eastern District of Wisconsin to the contrary.
The Ninth Circuit apparently adopted this line of reasoning when it
249. 63 T.C.M. 2672 (1992).
250. See supra notes 167-76 and accompanying text.
251. 63 T.C.M. at 2681-82.
252. Id. at 2682.
253. Id. at 2683.
254. 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935). Gregory is, of course, the paradigm of the substance over
form doctrine in the tax law.
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affirmed Waldman "substantially for the reasons stated by the Tax
Court.
255
The Sixth Circuit case adopting the Huff-Waldman-Stephens
reasoning is Bailey v. Commissioner. 6 In Bailey, the taxpayer was the
protagonist in a fraudulent pyramid type scheme similar to Huff257 In
1976 the Northern District of California fined Bailey $1,036,000 pursuant
to 15 U.S.C. § 45(1)251 for violating a 1971 consent decree with the
Federal Trade Commission under which he agreed to cease and desist
from operating his business in a deceptive manner. However, the court
granted Bailey's request that the payment of this $1,036,000 fine be
applied as restitution in settlement of a pending multidistrict class action
against the corporations and its officers in the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida. The California court's order authorizing the
transfer expressly stated that "the ultimate disposition of these funds in
no way shall alter their status as civil penalties" imposed under 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(1).259 Bailey claimed a reduction in his 1977 federal income taxes
under code section 1341260 as a result of the $1,036,000 payment. The
I.R.S. disallowed that claim, and Bailey filed a petition with the Tax
Court seeking a redetermination. In an unreported opinion The Tax
Court granted the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment on
255. Waldman v. Commissioner, 850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1988).
256. 756 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1985).
257. See supra note 186.
258. Bailey, 756 F.2d at 46. 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) provides:
(I) Penalty for violation of order; injunctions and other appropriate equitable relief
Any person, partnership, or corporation who violates an order of the
Commission after it has become final, and while such order is in effect, shall
forfeit and pay to the United States a civil penalty of not more than $10,000
for each violation, which shall accrue to the United States and may be
recovered in a civil action brought by the Attorney General of the United
States. Each separate violation of such an order shall be a separate offense,
except that in the case of a violation through continuing failure to obey or
neglect to obey a final order of the Commission, each day of continuance of
such failure or neglect shall be deemed a separate offense. In such actions,
the United States district courts are empowered to grant mandatory
injunctions and such other and further equitable relief as they deem
appropriate in the enforcement of such final orders of the Commission.
259. Id
260. Under I.RIC. section 1341, a special method of computing tax liability is available
where a taxpayer receives an item of income under a claim of right and includes the item in
income and in a later year must return the item because in reality he did not have an unrestricted
right to the income. I.R.C. § 1341 (1994). Under § 1341 the taxpayer will pay the lesser of(1)
his normal tax for the year of restoration, computed with a deduction for the restored item; or (2)
a tax computed without such deduction, but reduced by the amount the tax in the year of receipt
would have been decreased if the amount restored had been excluded. See Bailey, 756 F.2d at
46.
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several grounds, one of which was that the $1,036,000 payment was not
deductible under section 162(f).
261
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court, because it found that
Bailey's obligation to pay the $1,036,000 arose from his failure to obey
the terms of the consent order. The court reasoned that Bailey "forfeited
the $1,036,000 as punishment for his violations of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, and the payment was thus a fine 'imposed for purposes
of enforcing the law and as punishment for a violation thereof.'
262
The court concluded that,
[t]he fact that the California district court, upon Bailey's application,
permitted him to apply the $1,036,000 civil penalty toward the
settlement of his potential liabilities in the multidistrict class action
does not change the status of the payment as a civil penalty. The
characterization of a payment for purposes of § 162(f) turns on the
origin of the liability giving rise to it.
263
Two obvious difficulties arise in trying to connect this holding in
Bailey with the Huff- Waldman-Stephens line of cases. First, Bailey's
facts make it much easier to treat the restitution payment like the
underlying fine because the judge, in authorizing the application of the
fine towards the restitution explicitly, provided that "'the ultimate
disposition of these funds in no way shall alter their status as civil
penalties' imposed under 15 U.S.C. § 45(l). " 26 Second, despite its
obvious punitive nature, the underlying fine was a civil, not a criminal,
fine.
265
However, two counter-arguments indicate that Bailey belongs to the
Huff-Waldman-Stephens line of cases. First, although the Sixth Circuit
was aware of the California court's direction not to change the nature of
the payment, it never referred to this direction as a rationale for its
holding.266  Second, and more significantly, in Kraft v. United
States, 267 the Sixth Circuit cited Bailey as its precedent for holding that
261. Bailey, 756 F.2d at 46. For section 1341 to be applicable, a deduction must be
available for the amount restored in the year of restoration. Therefore the issue of the
deductibility of the $1,036,000 payment arises. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. (citations omitted).
264. Id. at 46 (citing district court's order). See also United States v. Bestline Prods., 412
F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
265. Bailey, 756 F.2d at 46-7.
266. Id.
267. 991 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1993). Kraft involved a podiatrist who was accused of cheating
Blue Cross/Blue Shield. As part of a Rule II Plea Agreement the taxpayer, Dr. Kraft, pleaded
guilty to one count of the Indictment and one count of the Information. Id. As part of the plea
agreement he agreed to pay $160,000 restitution to Blue Cross/Blue Shield prior to sentencing.
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a restitution payment arising in a criminal proceeding is automatically a
nondeductible penalty:
Dr. Kraft agreed "to pay Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Michigan $160,000 restitution prior to sentencing pursuant
to the [plea agreement]." Though the Krafts maintain that
this payment does not constitute a penalty, Sixth Circuit
precedent, establishes that Dr. Kraft's restitution payment
arose out of criminal proceedings thereby constituting a
non-deductible penalty. See Bailey v. Commissioner, 756
F.2d at 47 ("Bailey, therefore, forfeited the $1,036,000 as
punishment for his violations of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, and the payment was thus a fine imposed
for purposes of enforcing the law and as punishment for a
violation thereof.").268
Regardless of whether the Bailey decision is a clear adoption of the
Huff-Waldman-Stephens line of cases, the above quoted material
establishes that Kraft itself clearly follows the Huff- Waldman-Stephens
rationale that any penalty payment arising out of a criminal case is not
deductible.
Although generally payments arising out of a criminal case are not
deductible, the reasoning established by the Huff-Waldman-Stephens cases
is not universally followed. In the Stephens case itself, the Second
Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held that the restitution payment was
primarily a remedial measure to compensate the victim and was,
therefore, deductible, notwithstanding that it arose from a criminal
case.
269
In Stephens, the Second Circuit realized that its holding was
inconsistent with Waldman and tried to factually distinguish Waldman.
It pointed out that the entire sentence in Waldman was suspended on
condition that the restitution be paid and that therefore the purpose of the
restitution was equally compensatory and punitive.270  By contrast, in
Stephens, in addition to the restitution, a prison term and fines were also
imposed, thereby supporting the inference that the restitution was solely
As in Bailey, the taxpayer claimed he was entitled to section 1341 treatment for the restitution
payment and the issue before the court was whether the restitution payment was nondeductible
under section 162(o. Id. at 293-94.
268. Id. at 298-99 (quoting the Rule 11 Plea Agreement).
269. Stephens, 905 F.2d at 672-73. Also, the Second Circuit considered in its reasoning the
fact that the restitution was not paid to a "government" as required in section 162(0. Id. at 673-
74. The court explicitly stated: "Whether either consideration alone would suffice is a matter we
need not decide." Id. at 672.
270. Id.
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compensatory.27' Perhaps realizing its tenuous distinction of Waldman,
the Second Circuit added that "[t]o the extent that Waldman may be
interpreted as suggesting that a restitution payment, ordered in addition
to punishment and paid directly to a victim, would not be a deductible
loss, we respectfully disagree."272
Also disagreeing with Waldman is a decision from the Eastern
District of Wisconsin. In Spitz v. United States,27 the court addressed
the deductibility under section 162(f) of a $5,000 restitution payment
made by Mr. Spitz. Mr. Spitz was convicted of theft under Wisconsin
law for misappropriating funds paid for the construction of a house. As
a condition of probation, the court ordered him to pay $5,000 restitution
to the victim. In allowing a deduction for this amount, the district court
found that the restitution was not a fine. Similarly, it was not a penalty
since the payment was of an amount due and owing.274
Notably, Spitz does not contain any further analysis of the issue.
The Waldman275 court's criticism of Spitz seems well placed. Waldman
points out that Spitz (a) never explained how the State court, in a criminal
proceeding, could determine Spitz's liability to his victim; (b) never
focused on the fact that the restitution was ordered as a condition of
probation; and (c) never focused on Supreme Court of Wisconsin
precedent that restitution is part of the rehabilitative process in that it
forces a defendant to live up to his financial responsibilities.276
The last case which disagrees with the reasoning in the Huff-
Waldman-Stephens line of cases is True v. United States.277 One of the
issues before the Tenth Circuit was the deductibility under section 162(f)
of a penalty assessed under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
2 78
as a result of a pipeline leaking oil. After reviewing the pre-1969 judicial
public policy background and legislative history of section 162(f), the
court embraced the punitive-versus-remedial test described earlier in this
article.279 In introducing the test, the court stated that "[wjhether the
statute is determined to be 'criminal' or 'civil' is not conclusive.2 s0
271. Id.
272. Id. at 674. it should be noted that the Second Circuit also distinguished Bailey, on the
obvious ground that the payment there was originally imposed as a fine, and it retained its
characteristic as a penalty notwithstanding its diversion to the plaintiffs in the civil action. Id.
273. 432 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
274. Id.
275. Waldman v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1384, 1387 (1992).
276. Id.
277. 894 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990).
278. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1988).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 105-129.
280. True, 894 F.2d at 1204 (emphasis added).
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The court went on to state that criminal fines and similar retributive civil
penalties are not deductible, while compensatory or remedial penalties
and penalties for procedural-type failings are deductible. In holding that
the criminal or civil nature of the statute involved is not determinative,
the Tenth Circuit is at odds with Huff- Waldman-Stephens, which would
automatically hold any penalty imposed in a criminal case is
nondeductible.
2) Multiple Impositions
In determining the character of a particular penalty, a number of
courts were influenced by the existence of a second sanction imposed by
the same statute. In Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner,28'
the court addressed the character of liquidated damages imposed upon a
trucker convicted of operating a vehicle with a weight in excess of the
statutory limits. In finding the liquidated damages to be compensatory
in nature and hence deductible, the court was influenced by the fact that
the state imposed two separate sanctions for violating its vehicle weight
laws. Besides liquidated damages, Virginia law provided that any person
convicted of violating the weight limit regulations was to be punished by
a fine or imprisonment, or both--clearly a punitive sanction. Thus the
inference drawn by the court was that the liquidated damages were not
a second penalty, but rather a payment of another sort.282
Similarly, in Henson Robinson Co. v. Commissioner,283 the Tax
Court determined that a penalty imposed by a certain provision of the
Illinois Antitrust Act was a nondeductible punitive imposition because a
different provision provided for compensation in the form of treble
damages.2"4
Similarly, in Stephens v. Commissioner,285 the Second Circuit
extended this line of reasoning, to glean the intent not of a statute, but of
a judge in imposing restitution. The court was influenced to find the
restitution to be compensatory in part because the judge had already
punished the defendant with fines and a jail sentence.286
281. 708 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1983).
282. Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc., 708 F.2d at 1047.
283. 48 T.C.M. 508 (1984).
284. Id. at 509. The Tenth Circuit did likewise in True v. United States, 894 F.2d 1197,
1205-06 (10th Cir. 1990).
285. 905 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1990).
286. Id. at 673.
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3) Use of Penalty for Non-Punitive Purpose
The actual use of the penalty may also determine whether the
penalty is deductible. In True v. United States, 287 one of the issues
before the district court was the deductibility of a civil penalty imposed
under section 31 l(b)(6) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act28
as a consequence of an oil leakage from the taxpayer's pipeline. In
finding the penalty deductible, the district court was persuaded in part by
the fact that the penalty funds were used to pay the costs of administering
the law and to finance the cost of cleaning the oil spills when the costs
are not otherwise recoverable. 29  Although the Tenth Circuit reversed
the district court and found the penalty to be punitive and, therefore, not
deductible, it conceded that "employment of the proceeds.. .to administer
the Act and to finance cleanup costs actually does serve a remedial
purpose.
290
Also, the Sixth Circuit considered the use of funds collected through
fines in Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc. v. United States. 291  The
liquidated damages paid by violators of the Virginia statute were allocated
to a fund appropriated for the construction and maintenance of state
highways. According to the court, this factor "has the earmarks of a
provision for civil compensatory damages." '292 Hence, the court based
its decision in part on the state's use of the penalty payment.
However, the Sixth Circuit pointed out a danger in relying too
heavily on this fact. In Mason and Dixon Lines, the Virginia scheme
imposed fines, which were clearly not deductible, and, in addition,
liquidated damages, which were deductible, based in part on the
compensatory nature of the use to which such monies were put. In Tank
Truck,291 the penalty statute also contained a similar direction that the
money collected be applied to road repairs, yet the payment was held to
be nondeductible under the pre-1969 public policy doctrine. The Sixith
Circuit distinguished the Pennsylvania scheme in Tank Truck on the
ground that the Pennsylvania statute involved only one payment which
was clearly a fine, but which the statute applied to road repairs 94
Therefore, in determining the nature of a payment by looking at how the
287. 603 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Wyo. 1985), rev'd, 894 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990) (reversing
lower court's finding that the penalty was not deductible).
288. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1988).
289. True 603 F. Supp. at 1374.
290. True v. United States, 894 F.2d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 1990).
291. 708 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1983).
292. Id.
293. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
294. Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc., 708 F.2d at 1048.
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money is spent, one must also be mindful of the statute's general scheme.
4) Strict Liability
The District Court in True v. United States295 held that a penalty
incurred under section 31 l(b)(6) of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act was deductible despite section 162(0, in part, because section
311(b)(6) imposed strict liability on the operator for a discharge of
harmful substances regardless of fault. As such, the Act was a means to
shift the cost to the one most able to bear it and to insure against the risk.
The court, therefore, found that the penalty was not a punitive provision,
but rather a remedial or compensatory one and, thus, deductible under
section 162(0.296
On appeal the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court and
held that even a strict liability penalty could be punitive and
nondeductible. 297  It based its view on the pre-1969 case of Hoover
Motor Express Co. v. United States,298 which it read as a strict liability
case, since the statute imposed liability on anyone driving an overweight
truck even if the driver "acted with all due care and without willful
intent., 299  The Tenth Circuit then analyzed section 31 1(b)(6) of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act and found that although it did have
some remedial purposes, "on balance," the Act served mostly a deterrent
and retributive function similar to a criminal fine and was therefore
nondeductible.3 00
Arguably, the Claims Court in Colt Industries, Inc. v. United
States,30 1 can be read to approve the District Court's position in True
that a strict liability penalty is remedial. In response to the taxpayer's
reliance on the district court opinion in True, 2 the Claims Court in
Colt merely distinguished True without any hint of disagreement on the
strict liability point.03 The Claims Court found True inapplicable
solely because the penalties in Colt were imposed under a different
section of the statute, that did not impose penalities regardless of
295. 603 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Wyo. 1985), rev'd, 894 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990).
296. Id.
297. True, 894 F.2d at 1205.
298. 356 U.S. 38 (1958).
299. 894 F.2d at 1205 (quoting Hoover Motor Express Co., 356 U.S. at 40).
300. Id. at 1205-06.
301. 86-2 U.S.T.C. 9749 (CI. Ct. 1986), aftd, 880 F.2d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
302. Colt was decided by the Claims Court on October 23, 1986, well before the Tenth
Circuit's reversal of this part of the district court's opinion in True on January 29, 1990.
303. Colt Indus., Inc., 86-2 U.S.T.C. at 85,843.
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fault.3 4  Presumably, in Colt, but for the absence of a real strict
liability provision, True's reasoning would have been followed.
5) Miscellaneous Factors
a) Graduated Amount. In Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 5 the Sixth Circuit held that the payment of liquidated damages
for a violation of Virginia's vehicle weight laws was deductible despite
section 162(f).36 One of the factors considered by the court in finding
the liquidated damages provision compensatory in nature was that the
amount of damages was determined by the degree to which the offending
vehicle's weight exceeded the prescribed limit. The damages were
graduated so that the damages per pound of excess weight increased as
the magnitude of the violation increased. Thus, for excess weight of
5000 pounds or less the damages were two cents per pound while the
damages went up to five cents per pound when the excess weight was
more than 5000 pounds. The Sixth Circuit felt this reflects "the known
fact that damage to highways increases with added weight.""3 7
This graduated amount reasoning in Mason and Dixon Lines is
tenuous because the court assumes a correlation between the graduated
rate and highway damage. A strong argument could be made that a
purely punitive provision could have a similar graduation of the penalty
imposed. Logically, one who is guilty of an egregious violation should
receive a higher penalty than one who is guilty of only a slight violation.
Furthermore, the state may impose graduated punishment in order to deter
egregious violations more than minor ones.
b) Indefiniteness of Amount. In S & B Restaurant, v.
Commissioner,"8 the taxpayer and Pennsylvania's Department of
Environmental Resources reached on agreement that permitted the
taxpayer to continue discharging sewage into a waterway until a local
municipal sanitary sewer system became operational, at which time the
taxpayer had to connect to that system. In the meantime, the taxpayer
had to make monthly contributions to Pennsylvania's Clear Water Fund
in an amount designed to approximate what the taxpayer would have
been required to pay to the municipal sewer system had it then been in
operation. In holding these monthly payments deductible, the Tax Court
noted that "[t]he indefiniteness of the total amount of the payments makes
304. 86-2 U.S.T.C. 9749 at 85,843.
305. 708 F.2d 1043 96th Cir. 1983).
306. Id. at 1047-48 See supra text accompanying notes 217-18.
307. Id at 1047.
308. 73 T.C. 1226 (1980), See infra text accompanying note 306 for a more detail
discussion of this case.
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them distinguishable in some degree from a fine or penalty which is
usually in a fixed amount.""3 9 Thus, the indefiniteness of the amount
removed the payment from the category of a fine or penalty.
c) Toll Charge. In S & B Restaurant,3"' the Tax Court also
viewed the monthly payments as a license fee, and found the payments
deductible. The payments "were made by petitioner in consideration of
being allowed to continue to discharge its sewage waste, rather than as
a fine or similar penalty imposed by law or 'settlement of the
taxpayer's...actual liability for a fine or penalty.""'3 " In other words,
the payment was like a license fee or toll charge for being permitted to
do something, rather than a punitive imposition.
Revenue Ruling 88-463"2 presents another illustration of the toll
charge situation. Under the Federal Clean Air Act, it is unlawful to sell
any heavy-duty vehicle or engine unless it is covered by a certificate of
conformity. A penalty of not more than $10,000 per truck or engine is
imposed for any sale not covered by a certificate of conformity. A
certificate of conformity can be obtained either by conforming to certain
emission standards or by paying a nonconformance penalty ("NCP") if
the truck or engine exceeds the emission standard but not by more than
a certain upper limit associated with that standard.3" 3 In addressing the
deductibility of the NCP, the I.R.S. found that the legislative history of
the statute indicates that the NCP was not punitive in nature. Instead,
two different means exist for receiving a certificate of conformity: to
conform completely, to not conform completely, but fall within a range
of nonconformity allowable upon the payment of the NCP. Thus, the
NCP is not a nondeductible penalty, but an alternative means of
compliance.
d) Economic Equalization Payments. It has been suggested that a
monetary exaction equal to the savings achieved due to the violation of
a law is compensatory and hence deductible.3"4 Revenue Ruling 88-
463 ' indicates that NCPs are to be set at a level that will eliminate the
competitive advantage of a manufacturer of a nonconforming vehicle over
a manufacturer of a conforming vehicle. This factor, plus the permissive
characterization of the NCP in the legislative history, led the I.R.S. to
309. Id. at 1232.
310. 73 T.C. 1226 (1980).
311. 73 T.C. at 1232 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(1)(iii)). See generally, John
Skarbuck, DEDUCTING COMPENSATORY PENALTIES, 67 Taxes 786, 792 (1989).
312. 1988-1 C.B. 76.
313. Id.
314. See Skarbuck, supra note 312, at 792-93.
315. 1988-1 C.B. 76.
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conclude that NCPs were deductible." 6 The logic for allowing a
deduction for such payments seems to be that these payments are not
punitive at all; rather, their purpose is to equalize the position of
noncomplying and complying parties. As such they are remedial and thus
deductible.317
However, the Federal Circuit in Colt Industries, Inc. v. United
States,3" 8 did not find this reasoning persuasive. The court did not
dispute Colt's assertion that the penalty imposed returned the violator to
the financial position it would have been in had it complied with the
laws.3" 9 However, the court did not agree that such penalties in any
way compensated the government.32° Further, the court pointed out that
the EPA was not authorized under either the Clean Air or Clean Water
Acts to seek compensatory damages, but instead, was limited to injunctive
relief and monetary penalties.32" ' This factor has yet to substantially
influence the courts.
2. Prompt Compliance Penalties
The Senate Finance Committee Report on the Revenue Act of 1971
stated that sanctions "to encourage prompt compliance with filing or other
requirements which are really more in the nature of late filing charges or
interest charges" are not within section 162(f).322  When summarizing
the applicability of section 162(f), courts likewise render lip service to
this proposition.323 However, to date, no court has found a penalty to
be deductible because it was merely a prompt compliance penalty.
Decisions regarding Internal Revenue Code section 6651(a)(1) and
(2) illustrate the nondeductibility of late fees. Section 665 l(a)(1) imposes
an addition to tax for failing to timely file certain tax returns.324 The
addition is equal to five percent of the tax required to be shown on the
return for each month (or fraction thereof) the return is late, up to a
maximum of twenty-five percent. Section 6651 (a)(2) imposes an addition
316. Id.
317. See Skarbuck, supra note 312, at 793 (relying on Technical Advice Memorandum
8704003).
318. 880 F.2d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1989). See supra text accompanying notes 177-82.
319. Colt Indus., Inc., 880 F.2d at 1314.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. This part of the Report is quoted in the text accompanying note 121, supra.
323. See, e.g., True v. United States, 894 F.2d 1197, 1203-04 (10th Cir. 1990); Bailey v.
Commissioner, 756 F.2d 44, 46-47 (6th Cir. 1985); Waldman v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1384,
1387 (1987), aff'd, 850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1988); Huff v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 804, 824
(1983).
324. I.R.C. § 6651 (a)(1) (1994).
99 DICKINsoN LAW REVIEW SPRING 1995
to tax for failing to pay the amount of tax shown on certain tax
returns.325 The addition is equal to one-half percent of the amount
shown on the tax return for each month (or fraction thereof) that the
payment is late, up to a maximum of twenty-five percent. The addition
will not be imposed in either instance if the failure is due to reasonable
cause and not willful neglect. However, despite the character of these
exactions, both are nondeductible penalties under section 162(f).326
May v. Commissioner,12 one of the early cases decided under
section 162(f), is a good illustration of how the courts have handled the
prompt compliance issue. The issue before the Tax Court was the
deductibility of $881.34 paid as additions to tax under section 6651 (a)(2).
The taxpayer specifically referred to the legislative history and argued
that this addition to tax should have been considered as interest or as a
sanction to encourage prompt compliance in the nature of interest.
3 2
1
The court, however, did not accept this argument. Initially the court
noted that interest is imposed by section 6601(a). The section 6651 (a)(2)
amount serves as a penalty for failure to pay the proper amount of tax
and for allowing the tax debt to accrue. Additionally, the penalty, unlike
interest, can be avoided upon a showing of reasonable cause and is
limited to a maximum of twenty-five percent.329  Finally, the
regulations specifically include the section 665 1(a) additions to tax in the
definition of a fine or penalty within section 162(f), 30 and pre-1969
case law also disallowed a deduction for such amounts. 3
Rust Communications Groups, Inc. v. United States,332 a recent
case that follows May, also involves the deductibility of the section
6651 (a)(2) amount. In its analysis, the Claims Court compared section
6651(a)(2) with section 6651(a)(1) and noted that, while section
6651 (a)(2) was enacted in 1969, section 6651 (a)(1) was its much earlier
predecessor. The Supreme Court, in addressing section 6651(a)(1),
325. I.R.C. § 6651 (a)(2) (1994).
326. May v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1114 (1976) (regarding section 6651(a)(2)); Uhlenbrock
v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 818, 822 (1977) (regarding section 6651(a)(1)).
327. 65 T.C. 1114 (1976).
328. Id.
329. Id. at 1115-16.
330. Id. at 1116. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(1)(ii) specifically includes in the definition of
fines or similar penalties within section 162(t), all additions to tax, additional amounts and
assessable penalties imposed by Chapter 68 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 6651 is in
Chapter 68, Subchapter A, Part I of the Internal Revenue Code. It should be noted that this
regulation is based on language contained in the Senate Finance Committee Report on the
Revenue Act of 1971, which is quoted in the text at supra note 91.
331. 65 T.C. at 1117 (citing Reuter, Jr. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 599, 601-02 (1961)).
332. 90-1 U.S.T.C. 83,932 (Cl. Ct. 1990).
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characterized it as a civil penalty that resembled criminal sanctions for
failure to pay taxes.333 The Claims Court interpreted this statement to
mean that "civil assessments that enforce timely tax return filings are
penalties." The court went on to characterize the section 6651(a)(2)
addition as a "penal sanction rather than a service or finance charge. 334
Under the Claims Court's reasoning, it would seem that the 6651(a)(1)
addition would afortiori be a penal sanction, since the Supreme Court's
characterization was specifically addressed to this provision.
Finally, Revenue Ruling 78-196 illustrates the difficulty in qualifying
a prompt compliance penalty as deductible.3 5 In this ruling, the issue
before the I.R.S. was the deductibility of a liquidity deficiency penalty
imposed on a federal savings and loan association by the Board of the
Federal Home Loan Bank. The penalty, which was imposed because the
savings and loan association failed to maintain the required level of liquid
assets, was computed using the amount of the deficiency in liquid assets,
the period the deficiency existed, and the given interest rate.336
Notwithstanding the penalty's obvious similarity to interest, the I.R.S.
held that it was not interest and was, therefore, nondeductible under
section 162(f). The I.R.S. characterized the penalty as "punitive in nature
for allowing the liquidity deficiency to occur" and as being within section
1.162-21(b)(1)(ii) of the regulations. The penalty does not represent a
late filing fee because no filing deadline is involved. "Neither is the
penalty in the nature of an interest charge because no funds were
borrowed, but rather there was a liquid funds deficiency. Also, unlike
interest, a liquidity deficiency penalty may be, for good cause shown,
compromised, remitted, or mitigated, in whole or in part. . . ,,13' The
I.R.S.'s authorities for this finding, in addition to the cited provision of
the regulations and the Senate Finance Committee Report on the Revenue
Act of 1971, were the section 6651(a)(2) cases of May and
Uhlenbrock.
331
The I.R.S. presented its position most vividly in connection with the
adoption of the present regulations. After the enactment of the Revenue
Act of 1971 in December 1971, the Treasury withdrew certain regulations
proposed earlier, including those in section 1.162-21 under code section
162(f), and issued new proposed regulations. 39 The flush language of
333. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 495-96 (1943).
334. 90-1 U.S.T.C. at 83,937.
335. 1978-1 C.B. 45.
336. Id
337. Id.
338. Supra note 275.
339. 37 Fed. Reg. 25936 (Dec. 6, 1972).
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newly proposed regulation section 1.162-21 (b)(2) contained the following
language on prompt compliance penalties:
Such amount [i.e., a nondeductible fine or penalty] also
does not include a sanction imposed to encourage prompt
compliance with filing or other requirements if such
sanction is really more in the nature of a late charge or
interest charge than a fine, as for example, in the case of
a so-called penalty which is imposed with respect to the
late payment of a State Tax without regard to whether the
delay in payment was for reasonable cause.34
When the bulk of these proposed regulations were adopted in
February, 1975, 34' the paragraph containing the above language was not
included. The Treasury indicated that the provision would be
reproposed.342 On the same date, the reproposed portions were issued;
they did not include the above language.343 The Treasury's reason for
dropping this language was stated as follows:
A previous notice of proposed rule making ... contained
language excluding from the definition of a fine and
similar penalty sanctions imposed to encourage prompt
compliance with filing or other requirements if the sanction
was more in the nature of a late charge or interest charge
than a fine. This language has been removed because it is
inconsistent with the general Congressional intent in
enacting section 162(0 not to liberalize the law with
respect to the nondeductibility of fines and penalties.344
Thus, the Treasury does not accept this argument that prompt
compliance penalties are outside the scope of section 162(0. However,
as noted previously, 45 the Tenth Circuit has intimated that insofar as
the regulations might be interpreted "to include the procedural violations
Congress intended to exclude from section 162(f),13 46 they might be
subject to challenge in appropriate circumstances.
340. Id. at 25,938.
341. T.D. 7345, 40 Fed. Reg. 7437 (Feb. 20, 1975).
342. Id.
343. 40 Fed. Reg. 7453 (Feb. 20, 1975).
344. Id. These proposed regulations were adopted as final in 40 Fed. Reg. 29,290 (July 11,
1975).
345. Supra note 132.
346. True v. United States, 894 F.2d 1197, 1204 n. 18 (10th Cir. 1990).
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3. Settlements and Compromises
Very often, rather than going through a trial or an administrative
proceeding, an individual charged with misconduct that could result in the
imposition of a fine or similar penalty will settle or compromise the
matter. The issue is then raised whether such payment in settlement or
compromise is within the ambit of section 162(f), and, if it is, how the
punitive-versus-remedial dichotomy is applied.
Section 162(0 itself does not specifically address this issue, but
simply provides that no deduction is allowed for "any fine or similar
penalty paid to a government for the violation of any law."347  This
silence on the part of the statute is meaningful. When Congress enacted
the set of provisions in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which included
section 162(f), it explicitly required a criminal conviction or plea of
guilty or nolo contendere when it desired that there be such a
prerequisite.348 Thus, the failure to state any such requirement suggests
that none was intended.349 The regulations follow this view and
provide that a fine or similar penalty includes an amount "[p]aid in
settlement of the taxpayer's actual or potential liability for a fine or
penalty (civil or criminal).""35  The only contrary indication is
contained in the 1969 Senate Report which arguably construed section
162(0 as applying only to fines arising from a conviction in a full
criminal proceeding.35" ' However, as discussed previously in this
article, this report was criticized and corrected by the Senate Finance
Committee in connection with the Revenue Act of 1971.352
When faced with this issue, the Claims Court and the Tax Court
have both decided that settlements or compromise payments are within
section 162(f) and that section 1.162-21(b)(1)(iii) of the regulations is
valid. In Adolf Meller Co. v. United States,3 53 the taxpayer devised a
scheme to ship synthetic gemstones into the United States in such a
manner as to avoid the delays and disruptions caused by a new procedure
recently instituted by the United States Post Office. When custom
officials discovered this scheme, they sent the taxpayer a Notice of
Penalty demanding over $533,000, which represented a forfeiture of the
full value of the gemstones imported in allegedly mislabeled packages,
and also demanded over $55,000 for the customs duty due on the
347. I.R.C. § 162(f) (1994).
348. Compare I.R.C. § 162(g) with § 162(f). See supra text accompanying notes 7 and 100.
349. See Taggart, supra note 6,at 647-48.
350. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(l)(iii) (1975).
351. This portion of the report is quoted in the text accompanying supra note 88.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 88-103.
353. 600 F.2d 1360 (Ct. CI. 1979).
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allegedly mislabeled gems. After negotiations and administrative
proceedings, an agreement was reached in which the taxpayer agreed to
pay the customs duty allegedly due plus $43,000 in compromise of the
original penalty of $533,000. The taxpayer deducted the $43,000
payment on his tax return. When the I.R.S. disallowed this deduction
under section 162(f), the taxpayer paid the additional tax and ultimately
brought suit for a refund in the Claims Court.
The taxpayer argued the following two points before the Claims
Court: that section 162(f) did not apply to civil penalties, and even if it
did, section 162(f) did not apply to amounts paid in settlement of such
civil penalties.354  With respect to the first issue, as discussed
above,"5 the Claims Court held that section 162(f) does apply to civil
penalties. With regard to the settlement payment, the court noted that,
under the pre-1969 law, settlements were "treated as though they partook
of the character of the obligation which generated them. 356 In other
words, the court looked past the settlement payments and determined their
deductibility based on the act that necessitated the settlement. The court
then indicated that Congress did not intend to change this result in
enacting section 162(f) and held that section 162(f) applied to settlement
payments and that Treasury regulation section 1.162.21(b)(1)(iii) was
valid.3" 7
In S & B Restaurant, Inc. v. Commissioner,358 the Tax Court also
addressed this issue. The taxpayer owned and operated a motel and
restaurant in Pennsylvania. As part of its operations, S & B discharged
raw sewage directly into an underground waterway, allegedly in violation
of the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law. As a result of negotiations, the
taxpayer and Pennsylvania's Department of Environmental Resources
entered into an agreement, specifying that the taxpayer could continue to
discharge the sewage into the waterway until a local municipal sanitary
sewer system became operational, at which time the taxpayer had to
connect to that system. In the meantime, the taxpayer had to donate one
thousand dollars per month (later rising to $1,250 per month after the
taxpayer completed construction of additional motel units) to
Pennsylvania's Clean Water Fund. The monthly contribution to the
Clean Water Fund was designed to approximate what the taxpayer would
354. Id. at 1362.
355. See supra text accompanying notes 86-104.
356. 600 F.2d at 1364 (citing McGraw-Edison Co. v. United States, 300 F.2d 453, 456 (Ct.
C1. 1962)).
357. 600 F.2d at 1364.
358. 73 T.C. 1226 (1980).
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have been required to pay to the municipal sewer system had it then been
in operation. The taxpayer deducted the amounts it paid to the Clean
Water Fund during 1974 and 1975. The deductibility of these amounts
under section 162(f) was the issue before the Tax Court.
The taxpayer raised two points before the Tax Court. First, the
taxpayer argued that the payments did not constitute a fine or penalty.
Second, the taxpayer argued the payments were, in any event, outside of
section 162(f) because no legal proceeding was ever instituted against the
taxpayer and no conviction or other disposition of such proceeding was
involved, that is, that the payment was a settlement. After extensively
analyzing the facts, the Tax Court concluded that the payments were not
fines or similar penalties, but were deductible as fees paid for being
permitted to continue to discharge sewage into the waterway.
Although the taxpayer's second point was therefore moot, the Tax
Court addressed it anyway. The Tax Court stated that there was no
requirement that a legal proceeding be instituted as a precondition to the
applicability of section 162(f). In fact, the court noted that requiring the
institution of a legal proceeding may present a serious problem by
encouraging taxpayers "to pay early and get the deduction."'359
Although the Tax Court merely noted that Adolf Meller Co. upheld
regulation section 1.162-21(b)(1)(iii)3 6  and did not state its view
thereon, it did uphold the regulation in subsequent cases.36' More
recently both the Claims Court and the Federal Circuit upheld this
regulation.362
When determining if a settlement payment is punitive or remedial,
logic demands that the court make this decision based upon the nature or
character of the underlying claim. The Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit
have indicated that it is necessary to look to the "origin of the liability"
giving rise to a settlement to determine the characterization of a payment
under section 162(f).3 63 The subsequent cases on this point rely on the
Tax Court's opinions in either Middle Atlantic Distributors, Inc.3" or
359. Id. at 1234. Cf Taggart, supra note 6, at 620-21 (discussing "pay early and deduct" in
the context of treble damage payments under code section 162(g)).
360. S & B Restaurant, Inc., 73 T.C. at 1234 n.7.
361. See Henson Robinson Co. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. 508 (1984); Shapiro v.
Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. 136 (1981).
362. Colt Indus., Inc. v. United States, 86-2 U.S.T.C. 85,839 (Ct. Cl. 1986), affd, 880
F.2d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
363. See Waldman v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1384 (1987), aff'd, 850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir.
1988); Middle Atlantic Distributors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1136 (1979); Uhlenbrock v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 818 (1977); Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1993); Bailey
v. Commissioner, 756 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1985).
364. 72 T.C. 1136 (1979).
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Uhlenbrock,65 both of which adopt the Supreme Court's origin-of-the-
liability test as set forth in United States v. Gilmore.66
In Gilmore, the issue before the Supreme Court was the
deductibility, under Internal Revenue Code section 212(2), (and its
predecessor section under the 1939 Internal Revenue Code) of legal fees
attributable to the taxpayer's successful resistance to his wife's claims to
certain of his assets in a divorce proceeding. His assets consisted of
controlling stock interests in three franchised General Motors dealerships.
As president and principal shareholder, the taxpayer received salaries and
dividends totalling approximately $150,000 per year, which represented
virtually all of his annual income.
The taxpayer was interested in defeating his wife's claim to these
assets for two reasons. First, the taxpayer's loss of his controlling stock
interests to a hostile ex-wife would likely cost him his corporate
positions and the means of earning his livelihood. Second, there was a
danger that if the taxpayer was found guilty of his wife's sensational and
reputation-damaging charges, General Motors might exercise its option
to cancel the dealer franchises. 67  The taxpayer was ultimately
victorious in his divorce case, and the Court of Claims below found that
eighty percent of his legal fees in the divorce action were deductible as
an expense incurred under section 212(2) for the conservation of property
held for the production of income.368
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court and held that these
amounts were not deductible under section 212(2), explaining that in
order to be deductible, the underlying claim must arise in connection with
profit-seeking activities. The origin and nature of the underlying claim
is determinative, rather than the consequence if the claim is not defeated;
therefore, despite the fact that a loss in the divorce litigation would have
cost the taxpayer his income-producing positions and property, the nature
of the claim was personal. The claim arose out of the taxpayer's marital
status, which is clearly not a profit-seeking activity.
The origin-of-the-liability test is used both in the simple situation of
when an asserted claim against the taxpayer is settled, rendering it
necessary to determine if the amount paid represents a punitive or
remedial payment, as well as in more complicated situations when the
365. 67 T.C. at 818
366. 372 U.S. 39, 48-49 (1963). See also Andrews, supra note 46, at 317.
367. 372 U.S. at 41-42.
368. 372 Id. at 42-43. Technically, the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court addressed
the deductibility of such amounts under section 23(a) (2) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code.
However, section 212(2) of the 1954 (and 1986) Internal Revenue Code are substantially
identical. Id. at 40 n.3.
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taxpayer argues that there has been a transformation of his payment from
one type into another. Middle Atlantic Distributors, Inc. v.
Commissioner,369 which was already discussed earlier, illustrates the
simple situation.37 In this case, the United States Customs Service
initially sought over $500,000 from the taxpayer as a "penalty or
liquidated damages" but eventually settled for $100,000. In the course
of determining whether the $100,000 was deductible, the Tax Court stated
that "the character of the payment involved depends on the origin of the
liability giving rise to it."37' The court, therefore, commenced its
analysis by examining the character of the statute under which the
Customs Service originally asserted its claim against the taxpayer.
The second situation, when the taxpayer argues there has been a
transformation of his payment, is illustrated by Uhlenbrock v.
Commissioner.3 72 In Uhlenbrock, the taxpayer was the co-executor of
an estate as well as a legatee. The estate filed its federal estate tax return
five months late, resulting in an addition to tax under Code section
6651(a)(1) for over $39,000. After exhausting its remaining assets, the
estate still owed over $30,000, plus interest, to the government.
Ultimately, the beneficiaries and fiduciaries of the estate reached an
agreement as to how to share this obligation among themselves. The
taxpayer's share came to over $7,900, which he paid in 1973. The
taxpayer claimed a deduction on his tax return for this amount, and the
I.R.S. disallowed the portion attributable to the section 665 1(a) addition
to tax for late payment under section 162(f).37s One of the arguments
raised by the taxpayer in support of being able to deduct this amount was
that even if a section 6651(a) addition to tax is a nondeductible penalty
under section 162(f) (which the Tax Court held it was), under the statute
imposing liability on a fiduciary in such circumstances, the amount was
transformed into a debt of the estate for which the fiduciary was liable.
The addition thereby lost its penalty character. 74 In rejecting this
369. 72 T.C. 1136 (1979).
370. See supra text accompanying notes 288-94.
371. 72 T.C. 1136 (1979).
372. 67 T.C. 818 (1977).
373. Id. at 821. Technically, the taxpayer claimed the deduction for this amount under
section 212 as an expense in connection with the production of income, however, the Tax Court
held that the section 162 requisites for deductibility had to be met for the amount to be deductible
under section 212. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(g). Thus, the Tax Court focused on section 162(0. Id.
374. Id. at 823. The provision which the taxpayer relied upon was 31 U.S.C. § 192 (1970)
which provided:
Liability of Fiduciaries. Every executor, administrator, or assignee, or other person,
who pays, in whole or in part, any debt due by the person or estate for whom or for
which he acts before he satisfies and pays the debts due to the United States from
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argument, the Tax Court referred to the need to look "to the origin of the
liability involved to determine its true characterization. ' 3  In doing so,
the court determined that this addition was essentially a penalty for the
taxpayer's "failure to exercise ordinary care in seeing to the timely filing
of the estate tax return.
376
Revenue Ruling 81-151 contains another interesting application of
the origin-of-the liability doctrine .37  Here a corporation incurred a fine
as a result of pleading guilty to making illegal political contributions. A
shareholder's derivative action was later filed against both the corporation
and the three officers who caused it to engage in the illegal activity.
Essentially, the suit sought to obtain reimbursement from the officers for
the illegal contributions and fine. A, the officer involved, ultimately paid
an amount to the corporation for his portion of the illegal contributions
and fine. The ruling addressed the issue of whether the amount A paid
was deductible under sections 162 and 165. In ruling that a deduction
was not available under section 162 because of section 162(f), the I.R.S.
held that A's reimbursement retained the original underlying character of
the expenditures to which it related; thus, as an illegal political
contribution and a fine, it was not deductible.378
C. ... Paid to a Government..."
The next requirement for the applicability of section 162(f) is that
the fine or penalty must be "paid to a government. 37 9 The regulations
amplify this requirement by providing that it applies to the following
payments:
(1) The government of the United States, a State, a
territory or possession of the United States, the District of
Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico;
(2) The government of a foreign country; or
(3) A political subdivision of, or corporation or other
entity serving as an agency or instrumentality of, any of
the above.3"'
such person or estate, shall become answerable in his own person and estate to the
extent of such payments for the debts so due to the United States, or for so much
thereof as may remain due and unpaid.
375. Uhlenbrock, 67 T.C. at 823 (citations omitted).
376. d.
377. 1981-1 C.B. 74.
378. Id. at 75. The reader should compare this ruling with Barone v. Commissioner, 85
T.C. 462 (1985). See infra text accompanying notes 361-64.
379. I.R.C. § 162(0 (1994).
380. Reg. § 1.162-21(a) (1975).
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While this requirement seems relatively straight forward and non-
controversial, no legislative history is on point.3"' A number of cases
and Revenue Rulings seem to honor this requirement only in the breach.
The Tax Court appears to take the position that so long as a court orders
a payment, the "paid to a government" requirement will be met even if
a government does not ultimately pocket the payment. In Waldman v.
Commissioner,38 2 the taxpayer was sentenced to a one-to-ten year prison
term, but execution of the sentence was stayed on condition that he pay
specified amounts of restitution to his victims. Waldman paid $28,500
in restitution. The issue before the Tax Court was the deductibility of this
amount in light of section 162(f). In determining if the fine met the
"paid to a government" requirement, the court stated:
The State, moreover, exercised complete control over the
ultimate disposition of petitioner's payments. The court
ordered petitioner to pay specified amounts of restitution
to specified victims and informed him that "If the court
and the victims are not satisfied that things are going along
as they should be, we will not hold a probation violation
hearing; I will simply dissolve the stay of execution and
you will be committed to State Prison." We do not
believe that a Government must actually "pocket" the fine
or penalty to satisfy the "paid to a government"
requirement of section 162(f). Petitioner's "fine or
penalty" was "paid to a government" and is not
deductible.3 3
The Ninth Circuit presumably adopted this reasoning when it
affirmed Waldman "substantially for the reasons stated by the Tax Court
in its opinion.""3 ' The Tax Court continued this approach in Stephens
v. Commissioner385 and may have even extended it in Allied-Signal, Inc.
v. Commissioner.
8 6
381. The 1969 Senate Report merely repeats the statutory language without focusing on it.
See supra note 4, at 274; 1969-3 I.R.B. at 597. The Senate Finance Committee Report on the
Revenue Act of 1971 is silent on this point. See supra note 91.
382. 88 T.C. 1384 (1987), affd, 850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1988). See supra text
accompanying notes 193-95.
383. Waldman, 88 T.C. at 1389.
384. 850 F.2d at 611.
385. 93 T.C. 108 (1989), rev'd, 905 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1990). See supra text accompanying
notes 158-64
386. 63 T.C.M. 2672 (1992). Allied-Signal is discussed in more detail supra notes 167-76
and accompanying text.
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In Waldman,"s7 the sentencing court ordered the payment of
restitution as a condition to staying the execution of the one-to-ten year
prison term, but in Allied-Signal"'8 the court never directly ordered
anything. Instead, as discussed previously,"8 9 the court informally
assured the taxpayer that it would reduce the fine previously imposed by
the amount of the taxpayer's "voluntary" contribution to a local
environmental fund. In addressing the "paid to a government"
requirement, the Tax Court merely cited Waldman and stated, "[t]he fact
that the payment at issue in this case was made to the Endowment does
not change our result." The payment was held to be within section
162(f) and therefore nondeductible.39°
Waldman sidesteps the literal "paid to a government" requirement,
but other cases and the I.R.S. basically ignore it. In Bailey v.
Commissioner,39 ' as previously discussed,392  Bailey was fined
$1,036,000 for violating an earlier consent decree with the Federal Trade
Commission. However, the sentencing court granted Bailey's request that
the $1,036,000 be applied as restitution in settlement of another case,
then pending, which arose from the same facts. In addressing Bailey's
argument that section 162(f) was inapplicable because the payment was
not a penalty paid to a government, but rather a restitution to private
litigants, the Sixth Circuit merely relied upon the origin-of-the-liability
doctrine.393  Since this payment originated as punishment for the
violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act, its nature as a
nondeductible fine remains unchanged, even though it was ultimately
applied to restitution to victims.
394
Bailey can be explained away because the judge who imposed the
original fine, and who later permitted the application of the fine towards
restitution, specifically stated that "the ultimate disposition of these funds
in no way shall alter their status as civil penalties."'3 95 However, a later
Sixth Circuit case involving a restitution payment to a private,
nongovernmental entity, merely cited Bailey, noting that the restitution
payment arose out of a criminal proceeding and held the payment to be
387. 88 T.C. at 1384.
388. 63 T.C.M. at 2672.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 168-72.
390. 63 T.C.M. at 2683.
391. 756 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1985).
392. See supra text accompanying notes 212-18.
393. This doctrine is discussed, infra, in notes 311-26 infra and accompanying text.
394. 756 F.2d at 46-47.
395. Id. at 46.
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nondeductible under section 162(0.396 That court never even discussed
the "paid to a government" requirement.
In Revenue Ruling 81-151,' 9' the I.R.S. relied on the origin-of-the-
liability test to establish the basic nondeductible, punitive nature of a
payment, but then virtually ignored the "paid to a government"
requirement. In this Revenue Ruling, as discussed previously,398 a
corporation made illegal political contributions and was fined.
Consequently, the corporation, derivatively, sued the officers for
reimbursement. In holding that the amount paid to the corporation by
one of the officers was nondeductible under section 162(0, the I.R.S.
focused solely on the nature of the payment and not on the "paid to the
government" requirement. Because the origin of the liability was an
illegal contribution and a fine, the officer's payment to the corporation
was nondeductible. The ruling never even mentioned the "paid to a
government" requirement.399
A possible way of harmonizing Bailey, Revenue Ruling 81-151, and,
perhaps, even Allied-Signal is suggested in Revenue Ruling 79-148.40o
Here, before being sentenced for unlawfully selling products to a foreign
country in violation of federal law, the taxpayer offered to contribute to
a local charity an amount equal to the maximum possible fine the
taxpayer was facing. At sentencing, the court suspended the taxpayer's
sentence, placed him on probation, and directed him to pay the proffered
amount to the charity. In determining the nondeductibility of charity
payments under section 162(0, the I.R.S. relied on section 1.162-
21(b)(1)(iii). This section stipulates that a fine or similar penalty includes
an amount paid in settlement of an actual or potential liability for a fine
or penalty. Here, the payment to charity in lieu of a fine was ruled to be
nondeductible under section 162(0.
Revenue Ruling 79-148 suggests that once a payment is determined
to be a "fine or similar" penalty under the normal requisites, including
the "paid to a government" requirement, any settlement, arrangement or
payment in lieu of such amount will automatically remain within section
162(0. One commentator referred to this concept, at least with respect
to Revenue Ruling 79-148, as piggybacking the "paid to a government"
requirement onto the "fine or similar penalty" requirement.4°'
396. Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1993).
397. 1981-1 C.B. 74.
398. See infra text accompanying notes 325-26.
399. 1981-1 C.B. at 74-75.
400. 1979-1 C.B. 93. Rev. Rul. 79-148 is discussed in more detail supra text accompanying
notes 202-04.
401. Andrews, supra note 46, at 327
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Piggybacking gives the court and others greater flexibility in
fashioning a non-fine alternative remedy without automatically taking the
alternative out of section 162(f) and making it deductible. The problem
with this approach, however, is that it is inconsistent with the literal
requirements of section 162(f), which imposes both a "fine or similar
penalty" and a "paid to a government" requirement.
Two cases notably apply the literal "paid to a government"
requirement. In upholding the deductibility of a victim's restitution
payment because it consititued neither a fine nor a penalty, Spitz v.
United States40 2 recognized the "paid to a government" requirement.
The court reasoned that "although the payment was funneled through the
State Department of Public Welfare, it was paid to... [the victim] not 'to
a government' within the meaning of § 162(f). 40 3
Finally, in Stephens v. Commissioner,0 4 the Second Circuit
reversed the Tax Court and held that a restitution payment fell outside the
scope of section 162(f). It emphasized that the Tax Court's reliance on
the origin of the liability argument and on Waldman was not well placed.
Stephens' payment was made to Raytheon, and not "to a
government." The Tax Court, relying on Waldman found
that "the fact that the payment in question was made to a
private person as restitution rather than to a Government
agency in and of itself does not preclude the application of
section 162(f)." In Waldman, noting that "the
characterization of a payment for purposes of section
162(f) depends on the origin of the liability giving rise to
it," the Tax Court disallowed a deduction for restitution
payments made as a condition of probation because the
"payments . were . . . in satisfaction of...criminal
liability to the State."
To the extent that Waldman may be interpreted as
suggesting that a restitution payment, ordered in addition
to punishment and paid directly to a victim, would not be
a deductible loss, we respectfully disagree. In codifying
the public policy exception to deductibility of expenses
under Section 162, Congress was clear and specific,
limiting the exception to bribes, kickbacks and other illegal
payments; a portion of treble damage payments; and fines
and similar penalties paid to a government05
402. 432 F. supp. 148 (E.D. Wis. 1977). Spitz is discussed in more detail, supra, text
accompanying notes 228-30.
403. Spitz, 432 F. Supp. at 150.
404. 905 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1990).
405. Id. at 673-74 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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Stephens, however, must be read cautiously. Immediately after the
above material, Stephens added that "[w]hether or not payment to a
private party always insulates restitution from the public policy exception
of Section 165, it does so on the facts of this case.
4 6
There are two additional grounds for the decision in Stephens. In
addition to the fact that the payment was to an individual and not to a
government, the Second Circuit also relied on the ground that the
restitution payment involved was "primarily a remedial measure to
compensate another party, not a 'fine or similar penalty.""'4 7 Pointedly,
the Second Circuit refused to decide if either ground alone would suffice.
"Two considerations drawn from Section 162(f) and the cases construing
that provision combine to support our conclusion in this case. Whether
either consideration alone would suffice is a matter we need not
decide."4"8
D. "...For the Violation of Any Law."
The final requirement of section 162(f) mandates that the payment
be "for the violation of any law.""4 9 This requirement will not detain
us long because no case exists on point and the legislative history is
silent. The regulations, make clear that the law need not be a federal
law, but can be a state or local law as well.4 0
The only commentator to recently, or perhaps ever, focus on this
"for the violation of any law" requirement did so from the vantage of
whether sanctions imposed upon attorneys under Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are deductible under section 162(f). " ' The
basic issue pertained to whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rise
to the level of a "law" under section 162(f). Based on a Tenth Circuit
case that interpreted a reference to "any statute" in the Equal Access to
Justice Act to be broad enough to include Rule 11, and on the fact that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are generally accorded the force of
a statute, the author concluded that Rule 11 is within the ambit "of "any
406. Id. at 674.
407. Id. at 672-73.
408. Id. at 672.
409. I.R.C. § 162(0 (1994).
410. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(I)(i)(1975) (refers to conviction or plea of guilty or nolo
contendere in a criminal proceeding, without limiting it in any way); § 1.162-21(b)(1)(ii)
(specifically refers to a civil penalty imposed by Federal, State or local law); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-
21(c) Exs.(6),(7) and (8)(referring respectively to violations of a state maximum vehicle weight
law, state environmental law and a local housing code).
411. Andrews, supra note 46, at 329.
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law" in section 162(f).412 Although not mentioned there, the section
162(0 regulations contain an example of a nondeductible fine, one
imposed for the violation of a city housing code.4" 3 Such codes
typically are not denominated "laws." Therefore, if a housing code is
given the force of a law for the purposes of Section 162(0, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure may too be considered a law and, hence, a
sanction imposed under Rule 11 would be nondeductible.
E. Miscellaneous
1. Payment of Another's Fine
An interesting issue arises when an individual pays a penalty on
behalf of another. Suppose the government fines A $100 under a law
that makes him liable even though the forbidden act was actually the fault
of B. A thereafter recovers the $100 from B. If section 162(0 would
have denied a deduction for payment of the $100, does it follow that B's
reimbursement of the $100 to A is nondeductible?
Clearly the mechanics of the payments should not be controlling.
The result should be the same if B pays the $100 to A who, either before
or afterwards, pays it to the government or if B actually makes the
payment directly to the government on behalf of A.
Two preliminary points must be briefly addressed before going to
the heart of the issue. First, the case presently under discussion
drastically differs from the issue that arises when a taxpayer who is liable
to a government for an exaction otherwise within section 162(0 pays
another person instead. In that situation, the money never rests with the
government, while here it does.4"4 Second, the present case also differs
from the issue arising when a fine or penalty is imposed on A because of
B's act or omission, and A pays the exaction without reimbursement from
B. Interestingly, the latter situation arose in Tank Truck,415 the leading
case in the pre-162(f) "public policy" disallowance area. In Tank Truck,
the taxpayer trucking company, which had sent out its drivers with
overweight loads, paid fines imposed on its drivers.4" 6 The Supreme
Court, after noting the fact that it was the drivers who had actually been
412. Id. at 330.
413. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(c) Ex.(8) (1975).
414. The other situation -- where the person liable to a government pays another person
instead -- is the restitution situation specifically addressed infra Part V.
415. Supra note 41.
416. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc., 56 U.S.30,34n.7 (1958).
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fined, simply proceeded as if the fines paid by the taxpayer had been
imposed on it.
In Barone v. Commissioner,417 the taxpayer owned a tractor and
engaged exclusively in pulling tractor trailers in interstate driving for
ICCC. On one trip, following an inspection of the truck, ICCC was
charged with violating a rule of the Virginia State Corporation
Commission's Rules and Regulations Governing the Operation of Motor
Vehicles Under Lease because of an inadequate lease that ICCC had
given to the taxpayer. Rather than contest the charge, ICCC paid the
$200 fine and then withheld the $200 from the taxpayer's paycheck
without his consent. The taxpayer claimed a deduction for the $200
withheld from him by ICCC, but the I.R.S. disallowed the deduction.
The I.R.S. argued before the Tax Court that section 162(0 required the
disallowance of this deduction. The Tax Court disagreed with the I.R.S.
and found section 162(f) inapplicable because the fine was imposed solely
on ICCC, not the taxpayer. No authority exists to extend section 162(f)
to the payment of a fine imposed on another." 8
Interestingly, the Tax Court in Barone did not mention Revenue
Ruling 81-151, 4 19 which suggests a different result. In this ruling, as
noted previously,420 an officer of a corporation reimbursed the
corporation for part of the illegal political contributions made by the
corporation over a period of years and for part of the resulting fine it
incurred. In disallowing the deduction under section 162(f), the I.R.S.
utilized the origin-of-the-liability doctrine. Because the reimbursement
concerned illegal political contributions and fines, the reimbursement
retained this underlying character and was nondeductible. Similarly, in
Barone, the amount paid by the taxpayer should not be deductible since
its origin was as a fine paid to a government, a payment clearly
nondeductible under section 162(0.
Perhaps Revenue Ruling 81-151 is distinguishable because in Barone
the taxpayer truck driver was in no way responsible for the inadequate
lease given by his employer. It also represented the payment of another's
fine. In the Revenue Ruling, however, the officer involved approved the
illegal political contributions and, thus, bore some direct responsibility for
the underlying imposition. In the Ruling, a court approved the settlement
of the derivative suit against the officer, thereby implicitly recognizing
the meritorious nature of the claim against the officer. His
417. 85 T.C. 462 (1985).
418. Id. at 467-68.
419. 1981-1 C.B. 74.
420. See supra text accompanying notes 325-26.
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reimbursement, therefore, could be deemed to be more directly connected
to the underlying payment.
Applying these principles to the hypothetical involving A and B,
when B is responsible for the exaction against A, the "origin of the
liability" doctrine should apply to make B's reimbursement to A
nondeductible, like the underlying exaction upon A. Where B is not
responsible for the exaction against A, but pays it either involuntarily (as
did Mr. Barone) or in some other, non-culpable capacity, then the
payment ought to be deductible, insofar as section 162(f) is concerned.
Part V - Restitution Payments
In attempting to determine if restitution payments by a stock
swindler/manipulator or by someone who embezzled or otherwise stole
funds42' are deductible, two possible approaches exist. The first, which
is narrow in scope, simply addresses the issue through the prism of
section 162(f). The other approach views the issue from the vantage
point of restitution.
A. The Section 162() Prism.
Under section 162(f), Spitz, Waldman, Bailey, Kraft and Stephens
are the only cases to address the deductibility of restitution payments. 22
These cases are split on the issue. The Tax Court and Sixth and Ninth
Circuits disallowed the deductions, while a District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin and the Second Circuit allowed the deductions.
From a technical standpoint, the analysis under section 162(f)
remains clear and simple. The threshold issue should be whether the
restitution fulfills the "paid to a government" requirement. If it succeeds,
one must determine if the payment is a "similar penalty," and, therefore,
a deduction is disallowed by section 162(f). This latter determination
depends on whether the restitution payment is punitive or remedial in
nature.
421. This section only addresses the issue of restitution by one who wrongfully obtained
funds and must now make restitution of such funds. This section does not address the situation
where the deductibility of reimbursements made to an individual, but where the individual
involved did not pocket anything initially. This latter situation is illustrated by Barone v.
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 762 (1985) and Rev. Rul. 81-151, 1981-1 C.B. 74, which are discussed
supra notes 361-64, and accompanying text.
422. Supra Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292(6th Cir. 1993); Stephens v. Commissioner,
88T.C. 1384 (1987) affd, 850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1988); Bailey v. Commissioner, 756 F.2d 44
(6th Cir. 1985); Spitz v. United States, 432 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
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In reality, however, as discussed above,423 the cases disallowing a
deduction for restitution payments either ignore the "paid to a
government" requirement or piggyback this requirement onto the fine or
similar penalty requirement.424 They direct their attention toward
determining whether the particular restitution payment involved is
punitive or remedial in nature. As to this latter determination, since each
situation must be judged by its own unique facts and circumstances,
different conclusions could be expected. This is especially true in view
of the fact that even the criminal law cannot determine if restitution is
punitive or remedial.425
B. The Restitution Vantage
If the deductibility issue is approached from the vantage of
restitution in general, one must start with the seminal case of James v.
United States.426 In James, the Supreme Court held that gross income
must include embezzled funds in the year in which the funds were
misappropriated.427 The Court went on to strongly imply that a
deduction is available when the victim is repaid the misappropriated
funds.428
When misappropriated funds are voluntarily repaid, so long as
income was recognized when the funds were embezzled, the offsetting
deduction seems to be available.429 However, when the court compels
the return of misappropriations, the availability of the deduction is more
problematic.4"' It is not entirely clear why this occurs. Presumably,
423. See supra text accompanying notes 327-53.
424. See supra text accompanying note 346.
425. See generally, JOE HUDSON AND BURT GALAWAY, CONSIDERING THE VICTIM
(1975);STEPHEN SCHAEFFER, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION TO VICnMS OF CRIME (2d ed.
1970); Andrew H. Elder, Criminal Law - Sentencing - Restitution: The Restitution Provisions
of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 Violate the Fifth and Seventh Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States - US. v. Melden 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ala. 1983), 53 U.
CIN. L. REV. 263 (1984); Alan T. Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime:
Assessing the Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REv. 52, 57 (1982). See also Robert T.
Manicke, A Tax Deduction for Restitutionary Payments? Solving the Dilemma of the Thwarted
Embezzler, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 593, 609-12 (1992).
426. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
427. Id.
428. "If and when the victim recovers the embezzled funds there is "of course" a reduction
in the embezzler's income." Id. at 220. See also Tyler, supra note 16, at 673-74.
429. See, e.g., Stephens v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 108 (1989), rev'd, 905 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.
1990); Norman v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 1337 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969);
lanniello v. Commissioner 98 T.C. 165, 174 (1992); Foster v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. 661, 665
n.5 (1989); Bowden v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. 819, 821 (1980); Yerkie v. Commissioner, 67
T.C. 388, 392-94 (1976).
430. See, e.g., Stephens 905 F.2d at 671; Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292 (7th Cir.
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once the court intervenes, the payment more closely resembles a non-
deductible fine. If it arose in a criminal proceeding or in lieu of a fine,
perhaps some notion of public policy intrudes to make the payment
nondeductible.43" '
Analytically, to understand why a deduction presents problems in the
face of court compulsion, one must backtrack and identify the source of
the deduction for the repayment of misappropriated funds. Although
some commentators try to cast a broader net,432 only two possible
sources for the deduction truly exist. First, section 162(a) could apply to
a taxpayer engaging in the trade or business of embezzling, an unlikely
scenario, especially when only one or several embezzlements or series of
embezzlements are involved.433 However, if the obligation to make
restitution arises from the taxpayer's regular trade or business activities
as, for instance, when a stock trader or arbitrageur violates the securities
laws, then section 162(a) would be the source for the deduction. When
this is the case, the prior discussion of section 162(f) is applicable.
The second possible source for the deduction is section 165(c)(2).
This section allows a deduction for "losses incurred in any transaction
entered into for profit, though not connected with a trade or
business." '4 34 In theory, the embezzlement, albeit illegal, is a profit
seeking transaction that generates taxable income. Any restitution
therefrom is a loss incurred in connection with this transaction. If the
deduction is to be disallowed, it must be disallowed on the nonstatutory,
public policy grounds that have developed under section 165."' While
it might initially appear that section 165's judicial public policy
considerations differ from those developed under section 162(f), in reality
they have converged. Both the section 165 judicial public policy
developments and section 162(f) trace their origins to Tank Truck43 6 and
the other pre-1969 Supreme Court cases discussed in Part III of this
article.437 In fact, prior to the 1969 codification of the public policy
1993); Waldman v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1384 (1987) aff'd, 850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1988);
Bailey v. Commissioner, 756 F.2d (6th Cir. 1985); and.
431. See supra text accompanying notes 186-234.
432. See, e.g., Manicke, supra note 370, at 596-98, 605-08.
433. See, e.g., Kraft, 991 F.2d at 298.
434. I.R.C. § 165(c)(2) (1994). See, e.g., Stephens, 905 F.2d at 670; Kraft, 991 F.2d at 298;
Mannette v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 990 (1978).
435. See, e.g., Wood v. United States, 863 F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 1989); Holt v.
Commissioner, 69 T.C. 75 (1977), affdper curiam, 611 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1980); Lincoln v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. 185 (1985); Holmes v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 114 (1977); Mazzei v.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 497 (1974).
436. See supra note 41.
437. See, e.g., Stephens, 905 F.2d at 670-71, 671-72.
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developments in section 162(0, the tests for nondeductibility of business
expenses under section 162 and losses under section 165 mirrored each
other.438  In addition, Stephens,439  a case concerning section
165(c)(2), held that the principles of section 162(f) apply. Both the Tax
Court below and the Second Circuit on appeal extensively analyzed those
principles in arriving at their conclusions under section 165(c)(2).440
Thus, even under section 165(c)(2), the deductibility of the restitution
payment depends ultimately on section 162(f), under which the cases are
split.
C. Correct Result
This author believes that a deduction should be available for
restitution payments. Principles of fairness require that if the receipt of
funds results in gross income, the repayment of those funds should result
in an offsetting deduction. This is the case with lawfully obtained
income, and under the Supreme Court's now famous pronouncement in
James v. United States441 is also the case with unlawfully obtained
income. The mere fact that a court orders the restitution should not
change the result. If anything, once the underlying unlawful act occurred,
the law should encourage restitution, which the granting of a deduction
accomplishes.
The mere fact that the restitution is somehow connected with an
antecedent unlawful act should not be a bar to deductibility. In the
Heininger case,442 the Supreme Court upheld the deductibility of legal
fees incurred in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the Post Office
Department from closing down a fraudulent business. The Supreme
Court stated that "it has never been thought, however, that the mere fact
that an expenditure bears a remote relation to an illegal act makes it non-
deductible.443  The Supreme Court reenforced this view in
Commissioner v. Tellier444 and in James v. United States. 445  In
438. Id. at 672.
439. See supra note 196.
440. Stephens, 93 905 F.2d at 672. The rationale expressed by the Second Circuit is that
"Congress can hardly be considered to have intended to create a scheme where a payment would
not pass muster under Section 162(0 but would still qualify for deduction under Section 165."
Id.
441. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
442. See Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
443. Id. at 473.
444. See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
445. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
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James, the Court specifically indicated that a deduction should be
available to an embezzler upon the payment of restitution.
Finally, in a related area addressed in tandem with the enactment of
section 162(f), Congress recognized that restitution payments arising from
criminal conduct should be deductible while any additional punitive
sanctions should not. Thus, Code section 162(g) disallows a deduction
for only the punitive two-thirds of any antitrust treble damages paid after
a criminal conviction or plea of guilty or nolo contendere. The one-third
restitution remains deductible." 6
Part VI - Environmental Impositions
The application of section 162(f) to payments imposed on
environmental polluters is very straight-forward. The payment of any
fine or "similar penalty" imposed for punitive purposes may not qualify
for a deduction. Other payments, such as compensatory payments, clean-
up costs, or toll charges may be deductible447 -- at least as far as section
162(f) is concerned. Such latter payments, especially clean-up costs that
generate long-term benefits or long-lived assets, may have to be
capitalized and then deducted, if at all, via the Tax Code's depreciation
or amortization mechanisms.448 Of course, determining whether an
imposition is punitive or remedial might be very difficult. For instance,
in True v. United States,449 the District Court held that a civil penalty
imposed by Section 311(b)(3) & (6) of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act45 for leakage of oil failed to constitute punitive damages,
whereas, the Tenth Circuit disagreed and characterized them as punitive.
To date, limited authority exists on point. Only three cases address
the deductibility of environmental impositions. These are True v. United
States45" ' (Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 311 (b)(3) & (6)) Colt
446. The 1969 Senate Report, supra note 9, makes it clear that the Senate, was aware of the
fact that in Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 C.B. 52, the I.R.S. had ruled that amounts paid or incurred
to satisfy treble damage claims were fully deductible. The intent of what is now section 162(g)
was to disallow any deduction for the penalty portion (i.e., two thirds) of such amounts. Rev.
Rul. 1969-3 C.B. at 596-97.
447. See supra text accompanying notes 263-67.
448. See supra note 13. See also Thomas H. Steele, The Tax Consequences of the
Ownership and Cleanup of Environmentally Contaminated Properties, 26 Real Prop. Prob. &
Trust J. 655 (1991); Eric R. Fox & Michael F. Solomon, Who Incurs Environmental Clean-up Costs --
And Why -- May Determine Deductibility, 76 J. Tax. 12 (1992).
449. 603 F. Supp. 1370 (D. Wyo. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 894 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir.
1990).
450. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) & (6) (1994).
451. See True v. United States, 603 F. Supp. 1370 9D. Wyo. 1985), rev'd on other grounds,
894 F. 2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1990).
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Industries, Inc. v. United States452 (Federal Clean Water Act and
Federal Clean Air Act), and S & B Restaurant, Inc. v. Commissioner453
(Pa. Clean Streams Law), all of which were previously discussed. 54
However, Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Commissioner455  assumed the
nondeductibility of such payments. Revenue Ruling 88-46416 holds that
nonconformance penalties paid under section 206(g)(1) of the Federal
Clean Air Act are deductible because they are in the nature of a toll
charge or fee. 457  Furthermore Revenue Procedure 92-91411 provides
some conclusory guidance about the air emission allowance program
established by Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.
4 9
Finally, several examples in the Regulations indicate that no deduction is
available for fines or penalties paid for (1) violating the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act,460 (2) selling a new motor vehicle without the
required certificate of conformity, 46' and (3) violating a state's air
emission standards.462
Conclusion
Section 162(f) is an effective provision, which accomplished its
framers' intent. It codified a part of the pre-1969 judicial public policy
doctrine thereby continuing to limit the deductibility of payments that
violate a certain public policy, yet it provides limitations on, and
guidelines for, the scope of that public policy denial of deductions. This
provision seems to be quite flexible, perhaps too flexible. For instance,
notice how the "paid to a government" requirement is sidestepped by the
restitution cases previously discussed. The only problem areas are the
need to come to a uniform treatment of restitution payments, hopefully
by recognizing their deductibility, and to put meaning into the purely
procedural penalties which were intended to be deductible but which
seem not to be recognized as such by the I.R.S.
452. See Colt Indus., Inc. v. United States, 880, F.2d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
453. See S & B Restaurant, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1226 (1980).
454. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32, 142-44, 232-34, 241-44, 255-59, 263-64,
271-72 and 306-10.
455. See supra note 167. This case is discussed supra notes 167-76, 205-10 and
accompanying text.
456. See supra note 265.
457. This Revenue Ruling is discussed supra notes 265-70 and accompanying text
458. 1992-2 C.B. 32.
459. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2584 (1990).
460. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(c) Ex (2) (1975).
461. Id. at Ex (3).
462. Id. at Ex (7).
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POSTSCRIPT
In an opinion dated December 13, 1994, the Tax Court decided
Talley Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner.463 Here a subsidiary of the
taxpayer, Stencel, had overcharged the U.S. Navy for various work
performed from 1979 through 1984. In March, 1985 Stencel and three
of its senior employees were criminally indicated on 43 counts in
connection with some of the overcharges that occurred in 1984. Pursuant
to a plea agreement with the U.S. Attorney, Stencel pled guilty to 10
counts of submitting false claims to the government. The court accepted
the plea agreement and, in part, fined Stencel $10,000 on each of the
counts and ordered it to "make full restitution for all losses, to be
determined by the U.S. Navy at a later date.,4 64 Although the losses
to the Navy from these 10 incidents was only $1,885, the Navy and
Stencil reached a settlement agreement under which Stencel paid $2.5
million for all overcharges from 1979 through 1984, including the 10 for
which it pled guilty. Although the Navy estimated its actual losses at
only $1.56 million, the court noted that the settlement also covered
Stencel's potential liability under the federal Truth in Negotiation Act
("TINA"), 465 the federal False Claims Act ("FCA")4 66 as well as for
common law causes of action for breach of contract.a67The I.R.S.
disallowed Stencel's deduction for the $2.5 million and the issue before
the court was the deductibility of this $2.5 million payment.
It is interesting to note that in its notice of deficiency the IRS
disallowed the deduction because (1) it was not deductible under section
162(f); (2) it was not an ordinary and necessary expense; and (3) the
deduction would severely and immediately frustrate national public
policy.
468
Before the Tax Court the Commissioner argued that the payment
was not deductible under section 162(f) because it was in satisfaction of
the restitution order entered against Stencel in a criminal proceeding and
was specifically disallowed by Reg. section 1.162-21(b)(1)(i). The IRS
added that the full payment should be treated as court-ordered restitution
absent explicit language to the contrary in the settlement agreement. As
an alternative, the Commissioner argued that at least the $940,000 paid
463. 68 T.C.M. 1412 (1994).
464. Id. at 1413.
465. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(0(1982).
466. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982).
467. 68 T.C.M. at 1413-14.
468. Id. at 1414-15.
RESTITUTION PAYMENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL FINES
an excess of the government's actual damages should be treated as a
nondeductible fine or similar penalty.469
The taxpayer argued that the payment should be deductible
regardless of whether it satisfied the court ordered restitution. It argued
that the court ordered restitution was wholly independent of the criminal
sanctions and was not punitive in nature. In any event, according to the
taxpayer, the maximum that could be treated as court ordered restitution
is the government's total loss in the 42 instances of mischarging
described in the indictment which amounted to only $10,000.470 With
regard to Stencel's civil liability under TINA and FCA, the taxpayer
argued that both of these are compensatory and not punitive.47'
In its decision the court traced the development of section 162(t) and
reiterated its adherence to the punitive-versus-remedial dichotomy in
determining if a civil imposition is deductible. With respect to the
Commissioner's argument that since the restitution was court ordered it
fit within section 1.162-21(b)(1)(i) of the Regulations which defines a
"fine or similar penalty" to include amounts "[p]aid pursuant to . . . a
plea of guilty ... for a crime . . . in a criminal proceeding," the court
agreed. It held that even if such a payment is compensatory, it is
nevertheless not deductible under this regulation, the validity of which
was not questioned by the taxpayer.472 However, after a close review
of the transcript of the sentencing proceedings, the court held that the
District Court only ordered restitution with respect to the 10 counts to
which Stencel pleaded guilty. 473 The total losses to the Navy from
these 10 incidents was $1,885, and that is how much is
nondeductible.474
As to the balance of the $2.5 million payment, the court agreed with
the taxpayer that the issue of deductibility depended on whether the
payment was punitive or remedial. Since the settlement agreement was
silent on this issue and since it only provided that the payment was being
made in exchange for the government's agreement to surrender any
469. Id. at 1415-16.
470. Id. at 1415 and note 10.
471. Id. at 1415.
472. Id. at 1417-18.
473. Id. The portion of the transcript of the sentencing hearing quoted at 68 TCM 1413 n. 3
is quite explicit: "Now it is further ordered that the defendant make full and complete restituiton
to the United States government for all losses sustained in connection with these violations"
(emphasis added).
474. Although the settlement agreement did not allocate any specific amount to these 10
incidents, the court took note of the fact that, there was no dispute that this was the Navy's loss
on these 10 incidents. 68 T.C.M. at 1418.
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claims it might have under TINA and FCA, the court decided the issue
must be determined by an analysis of TINA and FCA as well as the facts
and circumstances surrounding the adoption of the settlement
agreement. 75
As to the TINA, the court gave it very short shift. Based on the Tax
Court's recent decision in Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner,476 the
court held that the TINA was purely compensatory.
With regard to the FCA the court displayed much more uncertainty.
The FCA allows for an award to the government consisting of a civil
penalty of $2,000, an amount equal to two times the damages sustained
by the government and costs of the civil action.477 In addition, the Tax
Court had already held that the FCA had both compensatory and punitive
characteristics.4 " Finally, the supreme Court recently held that a civil
penalty under the FCA which bore no "rational relation" to the
government's actual losses would be a criminal penalty for double
jeopardy purposes.479
However, despite the closeness of the question, the court rather
conclusorily held that the FCA is basically a compensatory statute, unless
the award bears no rational relation to the government's loss, in which
case the award in excess of the actual loss may be considered penal. 8
In turning to decide the nature of the $2.5 million payment at issue, the
court noted that the government never suggested it was attempting to
exact a civil penalty when it negotiated the settlement agreement. In
addition, the court focused on the fact that the $2.5 million payment was
substantially less than double the government's actual loss of $1.56
million (exclusive of the government's costs of investigation). Based on
this, the court concluded that the $2.5 million was compensatory and not
punitive in nature. 8'
The court's conclusion as to the compensatory nature of the entire
$2.5 million (less $1,885) is troubling. Initially, after carefully laying
down the analytical framework, the court seems to have rather abruptly
475. Id. at 1418.
476. 98 T.C. 518, 548-51 (1992), aftd, 17 F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1994).
477. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982) (as in effect for the years in issue). 68 T.C.M. at 1418.
478. 68 T.C.M. at 1418. The earlier case referred to was Grossman & Sons, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 48 T.C. 15, 30-31 (1967).
479. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
480. 68 T.C.M. at 1419.
481. Id. After deciding the section 162(0 issue the court went on to hold that this payment
was an ordinary and necessary expense, and deductible under section 162(a) and that if the
payment passed muster under section 162(0 it could not be disallowed on general public policy
considerations. Id. at 1418-19.
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decided that FCA payments are basically compensatory, and that the $2.5
million was also compensatory. Why does the court assume the $2.5
million bears a rational relation to the amount of actual loss simply
because it is much less than twice the actual loss of $1.56 million?
Similarly, while the costs of the government's investigation may be
relevant, the amount is not contained in the opinion and is purely
speculative, while, perhaps, $1.56 million might be compensatory, it
seems very doubtful if the additonal $940,000 is. It likely represents a
settlement of the potential penalty impositions available to the
government under the FCA.
While the court's ultimate conclusion is troublesome, the court's
method of analysis is consistent with Tax court precedent and that
described above. As to amounts paid pursuant to a guilty plea, the court
followed Waldman and section 1-162-219b)(1)(i) of the regulation. As
to the remainder of the payment, the court looked to the settlement
agreement which did not characterize it as either compensatory or
punitive but which did connect it with the taxpayer's exposure under te
TINA and FCA. The court then sought to determine the character of
payments under these statutes since that was the origin of the liability
(althoug the court did not use those words).

